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HEARING  
ON  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008  
AND  
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED  
PROGRAMS  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION  
—  
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING  
ON  
**BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
—

HEARING HELD  
FEBRUARY 14, 2007



—  
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ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

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**FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 14, 2007.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Let me welcome you to the House Armed Services Committee regarding the Army budget request. I thank you, Secretary Harvey and General Schoomaker, for appearing before us once again to present the Army Department of Defense budget.

I might say at the outset that we have a special guest, Secretary Harvey's wife Mary is here, and I am sure he will be very guarded in his answers to the penetrating questions. Mrs. Harvey, Mary Harvey, we welcome you.

The Army has long needed, in my opinion, an increase in the end strength. Back in 1995 Lieutenant Ted Stroop testified in this room, my recollection is it was just as our troops were going into Bosnia, and he said that we need an additional 40,000 soldiers. And of course we have had an increase in the end strength but we have been paying for them through the supplementals, and the request coming to us to pay for them is, in my opinion, correctly.

The fiscal year 2008 Army budget request is \$130 billion, a substantial \$20 billion increase over fiscal year 2007. That should go a long ways toward meeting the increase in the size of the Army.

The top priority I have in reviewing the Army's budget, no surprise, is readiness. General Schoomaker, you will recall that last year in July I asked you if you were comfortable with the readiness of the units here in the United States and your answer was no.

This committee intends to do everything to help change that so should you have that question in the future, would you have a different answer.

Today the Army is engaged in two primary conflicts. I recently returned from a trip to Afghanistan feeling that our fight there is winnable. And I wish I was as optimistic about Iraq as the President's proposed troop increase is on the doorstep.

The extension of troop increase in Iraq increases, in my opinion, the strategic risk to our country in that we may not have the right

resources when our country is next called upon to deter or respond to a conflict. In the last 30 years, we have had 12 military conflicts, some small, some, as you know, quite large. I hope that is not a forerunner of what the future holds, but it does give us cause to reflect on the potential and the threats that are out there.

So it is with some relief that I note that \$37 billion in fiscal year 2008 as a war request is allocated to reconstitute equipment that is lost or damaged in the war. My understanding is that 40 percent of the Army, National Guard, reserve and active duty is either in Iraq or Afghanistan. I remain concerned over the future combat system program. I am sure that you will discuss that today.

I also, without objection, place the remainder of my statement in the record.

I welcome you, Secretary Harvey and General Schoomaker. It is interesting to note, General Schoomaker, as I mentioned, the new Army uniforms, they harken back to the television pictures that we see of the calvary riding in its blue uniform of yesteryear on the frontier. Welcome, both of you, and thank you for your service. You make us proud.

Mr. Hunter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join you in welcoming our guests. Mr. Secretary and General Schoomaker, thanks for being with us today. We are fortunate to have each of you serving our country.

General Schoomaker, we understand this will be your last appearance at a posture hearing before the committee in your current role. We want you to know we appreciate all that you have done to help America's soldiers and their families during this war and all you have done to be a leader in this warfighting effort. I think you made the statement that you made a mistake by answering your cell phone in your pickup truck in Wyoming to get into this thing, but I think you have done an excellent job.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know whether we are not close enough to the microphone or the sound system is not picking us up.

Mr. HUNTER. I will try to get in closer, Mr. Chairman.

General Schoomaker, thank you for your efforts in this very challenging time for our country. You have got a long and illustrious career serving the uniform and serving our flag. We want to thank you for this career as you close out this last appearance before our committee. And as a world class team roper, I want you to know that rope is on its way, General.

We have the fundamental issues before the Congress and the committee that we have to address in this budget and we need to look at the budget and determine whether it establishes a proper policy framework, sufficient funding to meet current and future national security challenges and supports the need of our men and women in the United States Army.

You know, I think we concur that members on this committee have been to the warfighting theaters a lot of times. We have met with a lot of your great personnel. We have watched them in action and watched them undertake technically difficult systems that would have been very challenging in years past, and handling everything with a lot of balance and a lot of grace. It is my opinion that we have the finest Army we have ever had.

Having said that, I also applaud the administration's decision to increase the size of the Army by adding six brigade combat teams. This committee has taken the lead over the last 4 years in expanding the size of the Army by 30,000 to its present end strength of 512,000 from 482,000.

In 2006, we conducted a committee defense review, and I think your recommendation this year that the Army be increased in size is a validation of why we did that. We thought, and I personally thought, that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) had become a budget driven document rather than one that looked at the threat and looked at the requirement for capabilities and at that point laid out what we needed to defend the country and allowed us to decide what size funding box it was going to go into, but that the QDR had evolved into a budget driven document and we needed a capabilities driven document, which we produced with the committee defense review (CDR).

As you may know, we recommended an increase of eight Army brigades. And I am sorry that not all of the members of the committee did not endorse that CDR, but I think the validity of doing our own defense review and looking at the requirements and the world as it really is and the threat has basically justified that exercise.

One area that particularly concerns me is whether or not the national guard and reserve are getting what they need to properly reset. I have had some frank conversations with the guard.

Last year, General Schoomaker, you told us that you were going to be way short on reset money. What we did then, the now Chairman Skelton and I, was to schedule hearings. We had classified hearings in which you came in and told us what you needed. My direction to the staff at that point was to get every last dime of requirement laid out by your excellent staff folks and by you, as well as the requirements from the U.S. Marine Corps, figure out how much of that we funded in the base budget last year, how much was funded in the supplemental, and how much in the so-called bridge fund, and whatever the balance was, authorize and appropriate every dime of what you required.

We did that. At least my direction at that time was not to leave off a dime, to do everything we needed.

The total for the Marine Corps and the Army came to little under \$20 billion. That is what we authorized. That was followed by the appropriators and by the Senate, and that was what was finally signed by the President.

Talking to the national guard over the last several days, they stated that for some reason or other they did not get their oar in the water on their requirements and on reset. The figure I saw was that they felt that they had major shortages. Army National Guard

was something like \$24 billion and Air National Guard about \$14 billion.

So that is something that is kind of disturbing because we were going to war with a total force. Obviously keeping them up to speed and equipped is a key aspect of our warfighting capability.

So if you can talk about that a little bit today, General Schoomaker, and let us know where you think we need to go. Maybe we need to do the same thing as last year and that is come in with a big chunk of money for reset and for reequip of the guard units. If we have to do that, let's do it. Now is the time.

So I look forward to hearing from you. Mr. Secretary, obviously I want to hear your comments on this also.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. It is appropriate. We are leading off this year with this very, very important arm of America's national security. We appreciate all your service to the country.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the remarks and questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hunter.

An announcement for the committee members, there will be a classified briefing on Iran at 10 a.m. tomorrow.

Gentlemen, your full statements will be incorporated, without objection, in the record. If you could confine your remarks to four minutes, we would appreciate that.

I am very pleased that the committee is doing a good job of staying within the five-minute rule, which means more people have the opportunity to ask questions.

Secretary Harvey, thank you for being with us, and General Schoomaker.

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCIS J. HARVEY, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**

Secretary HARVEY. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, and distinguished members of the Committee on Armed Services, General Schoomaker and I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you on the posture of the United States Army.

Today, almost 600,000 soldiers are on active duty serving in nearly 80 countries worldwide and making enormous contributions and sacrifices.

Since 9/11, there have been over 750 active and reserve soldiers deployed in support of the global war on terror (GWOT). Their presence has enabled historic elections to occur in Afghanistan and Iraq and for democratic institutions to begin to take hold in these countries.

In addition, our soldiers have been involved in many operations to secure our homeland. The demands on the Army, however, are far greater than those associated with the war on terror. They include helping to defend South Korea, Japan and many other strategic partners; keeping the peace in the Sinai, the Balkans and the Horn of Africa; securing our borders as demonstrated by the major component of reserve component soldiers to the Southwest border during this past year; conducting operations and furnishing equipment in support to counter the flow of illegal drugs; and, finally, supporting civil authorities in response to natural disasters.



In the past 2 years I have visited thousands of soldiers at over 150 installations both here and abroad. Their boots on the ground reflect the very best our Nation has to offer. They symbolize America's commitment to advancing freedom and democracy in troubled spots worldwide. Their courage and unwavering devotion to duty never ceases to amaze me. I am proud to serve alongside General Schoomaker, to lead and to care for these dedicated patriots and their families.

We would both like to thank the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress for the considerable support that we have received to execute current operations, to begin to restore the depth and breadth of the readiness of our current force, and to build the Army of the future to transformation and modernization. We will need additional support to close the gap between demand in resources, particularly as we maintain an extraordinarily high operational pace and grow the Army.

Full support of our budget submission in our supplemental and GWOT requests is needed to enable continuing progress. In light of the growing threats to the Nation posed by states and nonstate movements and organizations, the environment in which our soldiers operate will remain extraordinarily dangerous for the foreseeable future. Our mission within this environment will remain largely unchanged. The Army, as a vital ground component of the joint team, will be required to conduct prompt, sustained, offensive, defensive and stability operations.

We will continue to provide the forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders needed to sustain the full range of U.S. global commitments. To accomplish our mission today and tomorrow we are executing four overarching and interrelated strategies. We are first providing relevant and ready land power for the 21st century.

Second, training and equipping soldiers to serve as warriors and growing adaptive leaders.

Third, sustaining an all volunteer force composed of highly competent soldiers who deserve an equally high quality of life.

And finally, providing the infrastructure and support to enable our forces to fulfill its strategic roles and missions.

The successful execution of these strategies is in turn critically dependent on the successful implementation of five initiatives. First, we must grow the Army and we are doing that. Second, we must reconstitute our force. We have a robust reset program to do that.

Third, we must modernize the force because force modernization and in particular the Future Combat System program are critical to the Army's future readiness.

Fourth, the Army must help to build partnerships with foreign militaries and to preserve the coalition that has been formed to counter terrorism by training and advising the military forces of many nations.

Finally, we must provide the required facilities infrastructure in a timely fashion if we are to grow the force, deploy well-trained cohesive units able to meet the demands placed upon them, reposture our units from overseas, and provide a quality of life for our soldiers and their families that is equal to the quality of their service.

We must get this right for our soldiers and their families, and we urge Congress to restore Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) funding at the very first opportunity to enable us to meet the requirements of law, minimize further disruptions and grow the force to sustain the long war.

In conclusion, the changes posed by the 21st century security environment driving the vision for the force we must become to continue to accomplish our mission and thereby to preserve the peace and freedom of our great Nation, we will ensure that our Army continues to be ready and relevant in terms of its capabilities and capacities for whatever the Nation requires.

To accomplish our mission today and to realize our vision over time, the Army must be fully resourced for fiscal year 2008 and beyond to enable it to simultaneously grow, transform and modernize while effectively fighting the war on terrorism. On this basis we ask the House Committee on Armed Services to authorize full funding of the fiscal year 2008 Presidential budget, the fiscal year 2008 GWOT request, and the 2007 emergency supplemental request.

I look forward to answering your questions. I will now turn it over to General Schoomaker for his opening remarks.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Harvey and General Schoomaker can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

The CHAIRMAN. General Schoomaker.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, CHIEF OF  
STAFF, U.S. ARMY**

General SCHOOMAKER. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, let me thank you for the kind words that you expressed today. I can tell you, although I have joked in the past about making a mistake about answering my cell phone, it was a distinct honor to be asked to come back and it has been a tremendous privilege to be able to serve the over 1 million active, national guard, and reserve members of our Army, their families, and the 240,000 civilians that we have in our Army. I thank you very much for those kind words.

I would also like to correct the record. I am a world class team roper, but it is not in the class I would like. Anybody that has roped with me knows that. I promise you at the age of 61, I am going to practice a lot after 10 April, when I leave the Army.

I would like to focus today on our efforts to increase the depth and breadth of the Army capabilities and readiness and in turn to decrease the levels of strategic risk that we currently assess.

But before I yield in my opening statement, I would like to introduce three members of the Army that are with us today.

First, from the Army National Guard is Sergeant First Class Vincenzo Battaglia from Roswell, Georgia. He is from the Georgia Army National Guard. Over the past 4 years, he has been mobilized or deployed for nearly 30 months. This combat medic served in Kuwait and Iraq from May of 2005 through May of 2006. As a member of the 108th Armor Battalion, he provided trauma care and medical support for American soldiers in Mahmudiyah to more than 2,000 Iraqi civilians. His adaptive thinking and professional competence enabled him to save the lives of four Iraqi civilians who

were so badly burned that the local clinic refused to treat them. Sergeant First Class Battaglia is the recipient of the Bronze Star Medal, the Combat Medic Badge and the Senior Aircraft Crewman Badge.

From the Army Reserve, Sergeant 1st Class Richard Salazar of San Antonio, Texas, who was mobilized and deployed to Iraq with the 336 Military Police Battalion of the 321st Civil Affairs Brigade from January through December of 2004. He is a battalion paralegal and a civil affairs specialist. During his time in Iraq, Sergeant 1st Class Salazar provided the only full-time legal support for over 600 soldiers, served as a field ordering officer, and maintained all the personnel records for a 400-person internment facility. He worked alongside the military police as they manned vehicle checkpoints and searched suspected insurgent safehouses.

Sergeant First Class Salazar as a soldier on Active, guard and reserve status also represents a critical aspect of what our reserve component soldiers provide, and that is full-time support to enable our guard and reserve units to sustain a high operational tempo and to support their mobilization activities. He is the recipient of the Combat Action Badge.

Finally, it is my pleasure to introduce Sergeant Jesse Greene, an active duty soldier, a military policeman as well, from Worcester, Massachusetts. He was deployed with the 293rd Military Police Company. His courage under fire as part of a team conducting a force protection mission in Diyala Province, Iraq, in 2004 led to the successful defense of an Iraqi police headquarters and saved numerous Iraqi police and civilian lives. For his efforts, he earned a Bronze Star Medal with "V" device for Valor, a Purple Heart Medal, and is the recipient of the Combat Action Badge.

These soldiers epitomize your Army and demonstrate why I am so proud to testify with them.

Finally, if you permit me in response to your opening statement, of the \$17.1 billion that was provided us this year by this committee, about \$3.4 billion of that is going to reset guard and reserve equipment. About 80 percent of the equipment that is forward deployed is active equipment. Obviously the residual 20 percent. Therefore, that is why there is that division. However, as you look at the budget that we are talking about today, as we talk about the posture statement, there is over \$40 billion worth of equipment in that budget for guard and reserve, about two-twenty, thirteen.

In response to your request, Mr. Hunter, for the unfinanced requirements list that I believe you received from me, there are about ten billion in there of unfinanced requirements that we provided in response to the request, which also includes guard and reserve equipment.

If you look beyond 2013, our estimation is there is approximately \$52 billion of additional equipment required to totally equip the Army. Inside of that \$52 billion is the \$10 billion of unfinanced.

The only reason I bring this up is to demonstrate the context and magnitude of what it would take. By 2013, we will have taken a very major chunk out of our readiness and recapitalization of the Army, but there is still work to do beyond that.

Finally, I would like to thank you for the considerable support we have received from this committee and the Congress to accom-

plish our mission today. As a result, the soldiers that we have deployed in the current theaters of operation are the best trained, best equipped and best led we have ever fielded. I have said that many times. I mean it from the heart. This is unquestionably the best Army we have ever fielded.

As I have explained in my recent testimony during our recent posture statement, our immediate challenge lies not in what we are fielding but it is enhancing the readiness of the nondeployed forces. It is the strategic depth of the Army that concerns me. We will need your continued support in several key areas to restore the readiness of our Army that will be needed to build the strategic depth required to respond decisively to both current and future threats.

With that I will conclude. I thank you again for your kind words and all of the support that this committee has provided the Army.

[The joint prepared statement of General Schoomaker and Secretary Harvey can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. A special welcome to Sergeants Battaglia, Salazar and Greene. We thank you for your service.

I am going to ask one question right now before I call on the gentleman from California.

The Army, and either one of you or both of you may wish to comment on this. The Army did not meet its authorized end strength of 512,000 in fiscal year 2007 and the President's budget of course, which is a good thing, calls for an increase in end strength.

The chairman of the oversight subcommittee, Congressman Meehan from Massachusetts, has recently pointed out a serious question regarding the quality of the new recruits. Some, of course, according to the news media and what Mr. Meehan has pointed out, have court records. Quality has been your gold star, and I wish you would comment on the quality of the young recruits that are coming in and what the future foretells for the quality of our Army.

The gentlemen behind you are national treasures, they and their colleagues, and it concerns me a great deal that there might be a dilution and the Army in the future may not be what they are today.

Will each or both of you comment on that? I am deeply concerned about that.

Secretary HARVEY. Mr. Chairman, I will start out.

First of all, let me address the issue of overall quality and then I will address the issue of the waiver situation.

In terms of quality, and I think the Chief will go into this in more detail, this is the highest quality force we have ever had. The reason I mention the Chief is the Chief goes back to Vietnam and he knows what a broken Army is and he knows what a low quality Army is and this is far from that.

First of all, only 3 out of 10 young people from the ages between 17 to 24 fully qualify for the Army.

Second, about 60 percent of those score in the top 50th percentile in our adaptive battery test, our so-called college board. If we look at the composition of the 2006 recruits, you will find that there is between the active and the reserve, there was over 12,000 individuals that had some college degree. As a matter of fact, 5,000 had

an associate degree or higher; 210 of our recruits had Master's Degrees, and 17 had PhDs.

In terms of the so-called Category four—and remember, we don't recruit Category five—Category four, by DOD standards, that is limited to four percent. We were slightly below four percent last year.

To give you a little perspective, if you look at 1980, for example, you will see that 50 percent of Army recruits were in Category four and there are many of those who did not have a high school degree. All of our recruits have a high school degree or equivalent. By those statistics and by the experience of our professional military soldiers, particularly officers that go back to Vietnam, this is the highest quality force we have ever had.

In terms of waivers, I pay very close attention to that. I look, we look and review those statistics every day. They have certainly gone up over the last couple of years and we have them by category, medical and moral. By policy we keep the percent of medical waivers referred to in the drug and alcohol abuse category to less than one percent; serious criminal misconduct by less than one percent. Those that are let in are reviewed personally individually by a general officer before they are allowed access in the Army.

In terms of misdemeanors, I guess our policy is the policy of the United States of America, and that is we give people a second chance. This is the country that gives people a second chance, and I hate to think if a young man or woman made one mistake in his or her life in their early years they would be banned from the Army or any other organization in America. I don't think that is the American way. I think we abide by that.

In terms of the medical waivers, again, both the misdemeanors and medical waivers, they have to be reviewed and approved by battalion or brigade commander. Then we look at those particular individuals that we have given waivers to in terms of their attrition and staying in the Army, and today of course it is the lowest attrition rate in early entry training, about six to seven percent. We find no difference between those individuals that are given a waiver in terms of attrition and those that weren't.

So we monitor that. We look at it at the beginning. We have the general officers involved for the serious and for the drug and alcohol. Again, I think it is the American way to give people a second chance. I know you have, Mr. Chairman, and I have had many, many people come up to me and say thank God I joined the Army. It really straightened me out. I wasn't the best guy or gal in the beginning; but once I was given the discipline and the leadership training and the education in the Army, I have had a very successful life. That is our attitude overall in regards to that.

The CHAIRMAN. General.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I can do little to improve upon that statement, but I would like to correct something. Last Friday I testified before the Defense Subcommittee and I made a statement that in the 1980's we had over 50 percent Cat 4s, and I was a little off. I have the chart here. We were at 50 percent in 1979 Cat 4s in the Army. At 1980, we were at 56 percent. We started declining, 35 percent, then 22. We got out of the double digits by 1985 when

we got to 9 percent Cat 4s. That is almost three times where we are today.

This is the highest quality force that I have served in. I look at the force from the standpoint of our discipline rates, drug abuse and the other kinds of indicators that we have out there, and such things as retention. Again, we are enjoying very low statistics on all of those categories. In my view, that is further evidence this is a very high quality force.

I think we are going about it correctly. I think we need to take a look at especially juvenile offenses. We need to take a case-by-case look at it and give some of these young men and women a chance in the Army. The Army has proven that it is a builder of young men and women and leaders for this Nation. I am very comfortable with what we are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. Back in fiscal year 2004, it was one-half of one percent, and it appears that it must be increasing somewhat; am I correct?

Secretary HARVEY. In terms of Category fours?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary HARVEY. My recollection is about two percent, Mr. Chairman. That happened to be under that year of the DOD standard of four percent. I think that was just a circumstance that happened at that time. It was about two percent, maybe one point eight, something like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, thanks for this hearing.

Let me go back to the equipment issue and to the Guard because I am still trying to get my arms around this thing. I think there may be a requirement for us to do some more this year in a supplemental or in the base bill.

Talking to the National Guard, and I have their resources for readiness document in front of me. General or Mr. Secretary, I don't know if you have seen this. It has Army National Guard unfunded. It has the program over the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) that you referred to, General, and it has an unfunded requirement of \$24 billion.

Now in talking to the guard earlier, specially when they were going over systems and platforms, like Humvees, the one theme was that guard units were going over to—were moving to the warfighting theaters and were dropping equipment early on in the operations in Kuwait, were taking on the upgraded equipment and going across the berm with upgraded equipment, with the new equipment, and that speaks well for the Army. But we are coming back without any equipment. So the theme being that they were dropping equipment, and what that implied to me was there was a lot of stuff sitting in motor pools or lots or inventory points in Kuwait or in country.

I look at the number of up-armored Humvees, for example, that we have sent to theater, about 15,000. That begs the question: What has happened to the Humvees, the soft Humvees that were replaced? Where did they go?

Just instinctively, it would appear that we don't have our arms around all of the equipment that is located, the inventories of

equipment that are located in the warfighting theaters. One example is the MAC kitted Humvees have been replaced. The Marine Corps has replaced those with 1114s. I believe they have one location in theater something like 1,800 MAC kitted Humvees. I wonder if there is a counterpart for the Army.

The last category that the national guard has, equipment not on hand. I don't know if you have seen their analysis here. They have a \$13.1 billion unfunded requirement for equipment not on hand.

My thought is the first thing we need to do is make sure that we have everything that is on hand, that is under the control of the United States Government, and I just suspect that there is quite a bit of equipment in Kuwait or in theater that nobody has got an inventory tag on that may mitigate that \$24 billion shortage. And there may indeed be equipment that other services have. For example, if the Marine Corps has totally upgraded to 1114s and have parked 1,800 perfectly good MAC kitted Humvees, then a transfer to the guard, that is something like 170 to \$200 million of Humvees in that one lot, might be something that would be beneficial to them.

What are your thoughts about whether or not we have a good handle on what the Army owns, period, whether it is in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Continental United States (CONUS)? Do you know what we have?

Secretary HARVEY. Mr. Hunter, I will start out. Yes, we do know what we have. We have an automated property book accounting system for every piece of equipment in and out of theater. We do have that.

I know you know this very well, but in regards to the non-1114, 1151, 1152 Humvees, there is on the order of 10 to 12,000 of those, they have been replaced by up-armored Humvees, you mentioned the plus 15,000. That is a correct number as of the end of January.

Those Humvees, those so-called Level two Humvees, a number have been brought to the United States for training. A number have been given to the Iraqis. A number have been given to the Afghans. They provide a high level of protection, but as you have noted in the past, they are not the 1114s that we know. So some of those have been given to the Iraqi and Afghan armies. Others have been brought back here for training, home station training and also for unit training.

And then we could distribute some of those Humvees to the national guard. However, the standard now is the up-armored. So that would be an interim solution that we could in fact implement.

From my point of view the national guard and the reserves work very closely with the G8. The Army speaks in identifying the equipment. We have detailed lists by state of every piece of equipment on hand. We call it EO8. We know exactly what they have on hand and then what they do, because of the rotation cycles of guard and reserves which you know is longer certainly in the active, they have subdivided the equipment that is not on hand into a category of 342 line items which are for State-related missions.

For example, last year in preparation for the hurricane season, all of the hurricane States, the so-called horizontal along the gulf and the vertical along the Atlantic, as well as Hawaii, had 100 per-

cent of the equipment that they needed to perform their hurricane mission if they were so called upon to do that.

So there is great visibility of every piece of equipment in the Army. There is a very keen awareness on the part of the Army staff on what the needs of the Army National Guard and Reserves are. And as the Chief noted, we have about \$45 billion in the Future Defense Program for that, and the Chief also identified the 24, and I have the same piece of paper you have, and that is outside the Future Years Defense Program. We can talk about whether you want to bring that in or not.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Secretary, Humvees, what if we isolate Humvees? Could you get us a fix on how many Humvees the Army owns, whether it is Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, or CONUS? Second, consult with the Army National Guard and ask them how many Humvees they are short?

Secretary HARVEY. Right.

Mr. HUNTER. If they are short X-thousand Humvees and we have X-thousand Humvees at various locations, a cumulative total of that, let's contemplate a transfer. For example, for hurricane-type missions, for homeland missions, up-armored Humvees are quite inconvenient.

Secretary HARVEY. Exactly. We would take the up-armor off.

Mr. HUNTER. So the ASKs, the early Humvees we sent over there, they might be ideal. That might be preferable to letting them go for a few pennies on the dollar to another country if in fact there are some shortages.

So two things. Can we get a number for the committee as to how many Humvees we by golly own in the U.S. Army? Number two, how many Humvees the Army Guard says it is short. We get those two numbers, then we will get that rope to General Schoomaker.

Secretary HARVEY. We do those numbers and the dynamics. We will check and submit it to you for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 71.]

General SCHOOMAKER. I would like to add, take just a contextual view. The Army has over 100,000 Humvees. As you know, when this war started, we had a requirement for about 253, I believe. We now have approaching 18,000 being up-armored. It would not be my advice that we try to up-armor all of the some hundred thousand Humvees because we already know that with the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MPAP) program that we want to move to a much more substantial vehicle that is designed with V hull, et cetera, to do it. So there is a crossover point on what we do.

The second point I would like to make, three years ago we did not have automation in the property accountability. We now have a system. And over the last two years, we have put three officers with teams in theater for the specific purpose of bringing this visibility under control and automating it so we know what we are doing. This year alone we doubled the amount of equipment that we retrograded and got it out of theater and got it into reset using the money you have given us.

What I would say is we have to be very careful as we look forward in how we want to apply our dollars so what we end up pro-



viding is something that is taking us forward, not resetting the past.

And the \$24 billion that you talk about is inside that \$52 billion that I said was beyond this budget, the 2013. However, inside this program is about \$46 billion worth of equipment for the guard and reserve. So there is a considerable chunk in there. If we want to accelerate more of that \$52 billion, that is another issue. But we do have a very aggressive program to make up for this shortage, and that is part of the strategic depth issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, and General, happy birthday.

Two things: The President's request for an additional 20,000 troops, this is directed to the General. Good thing, bad thing?

And directly tied to that on the MRAP program, the Marine Corps has what I think is a very reasonably aggressive program to replace every vehicle in theater, every wheeled vehicle in theater by the early part of next year, to have ordered and in place about 3,000 vehicles by early next year. The Army on the other hand is only asking for about 1,500, and considering that you have about 20,000 vehicles in Iraq, where I find a disconnect is if your answer is going to be that the additional 20,000 troops is a good thing, why is the Army apparently dragging its feet on getting more MRAP type vehicles to Iraq?

Please don't tell me it is dollars because believe me, I think I can speak for every member of this committee, we would much rather spend the money on the MRAP and find that the war ended sooner than we thought than have one kid needlessly buried at Arlington or one kid needlessly at Walter Reed without their arms or legs.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I share your feelings totally.

The MRAP program is a joint Marine-Army program, and it is under the management of the Department of the Navy is my understanding.

The Marine Corps and the Army, I am informed, both have equal money. It is about \$500 million, I believe, in that program. The Marine Corps' buy is about 1,066, something like that right now. They are asking for some 3,000. Our buy is 2,500.

The very first thing on the list that I provided at the request of Congressman Hunter is the MRAP inside that ten billion in unfunded requirements. So we have a sense of urgency and we have a desire to have that.

Mr. TAYLOR. So why a significantly lower number than the replacement of every vehicle? I should have figured this out, but the Humvee, when General Blum explained it to me, actually acts as a shape charge to direct the blast inside the cabin, which is why we hear the gunner being thrown out on a regular basis.

Given that it has become the enemy's weapon of choice, to put a pressure-detonated mine out there, or at least some mine underneath the vehicle, and given that I think you are going to say we need the additional 20,000 troops, why the hesitancy not to equip them with the best vehicle as quickly as possible, all of them?

General SCHOOMAKER. The answer, first of all, is that we are equipping them with the best we have. Again, we are losing not only Humvees, but we are losing tanks, Bradleys, Strykers.

Mr. TAYLOR. I understand. But we both know a disproportionately high percentage of the casualties are in Humvees.

General SCHOOMAKER. And with the kits, we have maximized what Humvee can do, and there is little else we can do that will change that.

We are aggressively pursuing the MRAP program. The MRAP that the Army and Marine Corps are buying right now are an off-the-shelf interim solution to a better designed joint vehicle for the future so that there is a point at which we want to cross over some time in the future as we develop that better vehicle and approach buying and replacing this—over 100,000 vehicles we have with something even better than the MRAP.

But today, we are providing those soldiers in theater with the very best we have, and that is the FRAG kit 5 on the Humvee; obviously the add-on armor that we are putting on the tanks, Bradleys, and the slat armor on Strykers, et cetera.

The problem is it is not just a matter of money, it is a matter of time and technology and industrial output. We are on an aggressive program, and we would like to make it more aggressive. That is why we have listed what our unfunded requirement is.

Secretary HARVEY. Let me add that the MRAP program is an outgrowth of what the Army started a year and a half ago in our so-called rapid equipping force. We have about 400 of these MRAP type vehicles already in theater. They are used for route clearance routinely. As the Chief said, this is the next evolution of that. It is an aggressive program. There are eight vendors that have been qualified that have submitted two vehicles apiece which the Marine Corps and the Army together will evaluate those, and then our plan is to— and this buy that we are talking about is the first buy. We will qualify one or more of those, whoever qualifies, and then about June of this year we will make production awards.

As part of this demonstration phase we will be assessing the industrial capacity of each one of those vendors and determine exactly what their capacity is and how rapidly they can make these large vehicles.

So the program is up and running. Its genesis is with the Army. As the Chief said, we have the best available technology today. This is the next step.

After the MRAP, we are also developing what we call a joint light tactical vehicle. We always tag team with the Marine Corps. In this case the Army will be in the lead, just like they were for the Humvees. We are starting on that. Our Marine Corps partners are doing the MRAP and we are doing the joint light tactical vehicle. We will continue, as we have done in the past, to evolve the protective capabilities of these multi-purpose vehicles.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKeon.

Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to introduce a guest who I have here with me today, a former constituent, a young man who in high school played football for one of my brothers. He joined the Army 14 years ago and has spent the last 3 years at Walter Reed. He was severely wounded in Iraq.

He was telling me a story today. As he finished his mission the morning he was wounded, he was passing back to his base and at the checkpoint ran into his brother who is an identical twin who

was over there as a member of the guard. He didn't know he was in country at the time. He knew he was coming, but he didn't know he was there that day.

Later that day he was wounded. His brother now is down on the border in Mexico.

Sergeant Bain, would you please stand? He is a great young man. He will be receiving a medical discharge on the 26th.

Knowing a young man like that, it makes you proud to be an American knowing we have those kinds of people out there protecting our freedoms around the world.

General and Secretary, thank you very much for your service and for the things you are doing for the country.

I have one brief question. That is that we are increasing the force size and to meet our proposed end strength increase, the Army will need additional funding for recruitment and retention. I am wondering if the base budget does include an increase in funding for recruitment and retention and to support the proposed end strength increase?

Secretary HARVEY. Yes. In the 2008 budget, when the President made his decision to grow the Army, we plussed up the budget we had at that time. There is money in the fiscal year 2008 budget to increase recruiting and retention. That is incorporated in there. Advertising, a few more recruiting non-commissioned officer's (NCOs) and so forth. All baked into the fiscal year 2008 budget.

I might also note that we have run detailed models of forecasting the growth of the Army. If we can repeat last year's performance of recruiting 80,000, and I am talking about the active, of course, and have the retention that we did last year, that we should end up this year in excess of 515,000. We should be able to grow the force between 7 and 9,000 a year as we go forward if we can repeat the fiscal year 2006 performance in the recruiting and retention categories.

Mr. McKEON. You feel you have enough in the budget to do sufficient advertising?

Secretary HARVEY. We do. We feel we are adequately resourced. And thanks for that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Secretary Harvey and General Schoomaker, for appearing before the committee and thank you for your service. And I also want to thank the upstanding heroes behind you for their service to our country. Particularly the sergeant from Worcester, Massachusetts. It is not quite in my district. I am not sure the general had the pronunciation correct. I thank all of you for your service.

Obviously, recruitment and retention is a big issue where all of us on this committee are concerned. We all support increasing the Army by 13,000. Many of us are concerned that in many instances our recruitment goals have been as high as they were in the past, the past year, for example.

But I am interested in the question of was—it was my understanding that the Army had cut recruiting efforts this year by \$125 million; is that true?

General SCHOOMAKER. Not to my knowledge, no.

Secretary HARVEY. You have to look at both the base budget and the supplemental to get a true picture of the moneys that we use. So you have to add those both together.

We can get that for the record; I don't have that off the top of my head.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 74.]

Mr. MEEHAN. If you could, Mr. Secretary. It may be it was cut by 125 million.

Secretary HARVEY. There could have been—if you have to add, as I said, both what is in the base budget and the supplemental together to get an idea, and we put them in, both, for accounting rules—but we will get you the total number between both those components.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Chairman Skelton mentioned the issue of statistics regarding recruit quality, and I am interested in these waiver issues. And let me just say that I couldn't agree with you more that the quality and the training, the education, background of our men and women in uniform is higher than it has ever been.

I am going to lead a trip to Iraq on Saturday, and I am always amazed at how effective and highly trained our forces are.

But I do think it is important to look at the studies that we are given. In 2003, the Army granted 8,836 waivers, a little more than 12 percent of total recruits. In 2006, that number was over 13,000 which accounted for nearly 20 percent of the total recruits. So basically, in four years we went from granting some kind of waiver to one in ten recruits to granting waivers in one in five recruits. And by 2006, more than 60 percent of those were waivers of this category, so-called "moral waivers," what seems to me to be going on—maybe that is okay, but in 2003 the most serious types of moral waivers, felonies and serious nontraffic offenses, made up about 64 percent of the Army's waivers. In 2006, 3 years later, that number was at 87 percent.

I don't want to get into all of these statistics that are in this particular report, but I do ask, Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent that the data provided to me by the Acting Deputy of the Under Secretary for Military Personnel Policy be entered into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 71.]

Mr. MEEHAN. And I would agree, Mr. Secretary, that we need to give people a second chance, sometimes a third chance. So I don't question that. And there are many instances where I have come forward with somebody that I know from my district, who made a mistake or maybe two, and I think they deserve a chance.

But the question is this: When we are under incredible pressure to get more recruits and the recruiters, to be effective, they have to increase the numbers, and the difficulty and recruiting environment being what it is with deployments and redeployments, the question is whether or not we are putting safeguards in place. And we may be. But are there safeguards in place to ensure that the reality of these statistics, what it means in terms of not only the

recruits that are coming in, but what are we doing to effectively make sure that it isn't getting too high, are we analyzing that, looking at the—you know, I have a law enforcement background—looking at the ramifications of those offenses and what it means to the future of our military?

And, again, at the outset, the most effective, well-educated fighting force in the history of the world; and I believe in second chances and even third. But we have to look at the data and the statistics and determine how that affects our recruiting, the pressure that is on the recruiters and whether or not we need some special programs to deal with these new recruits.

Secretary HARVEY. As I mentioned, Congressman—I mean, your concerns are absolutely right on the mark. I have the same concerns. And, therefore, as I mentioned, we have in those two serious categories, an individual cannot be assessed unless the general officer reviews that particular individual one at a time and approves it, both for the drug and alcohol and the serious misconduct category. So we have a check there.

And then as far as the other categories of the medical and the minor misdemeanor, they have to be approved by a battalion or brigade commander in the recruiting command. Then, once they are assessed, we track them in terms of whether their attrition rate—that means they drop out during basic training and the advanced individual training—between those two components we track whether or not there is abnormal attrition because, you know, we are really—if that is the case, we are wasting money, and so we certainly don't want to do that.

So we—I think we have enough checks and balances in the system to ensure that that doesn't happen.

And then, of course, once they get to their unit and you know they are under their platoon sergeant and under the command sergeant majors, you know they have to perform again, that is another change because, you know, the strength of the Army is the strength of the NCO, and our NCO corps in terms of their leadership and discipline is just unrivaled.

So I think there are enough checks all along to ensure that these people have, in fact, changed their life around. We have given them a second chance and they have proved that they have taken it.

So I feel very confident that we have it. And as soon as we see trends the other way, we will reassess that.

The chief and I meet every month with the entire leadership of the accessions command, top to bottom. We review the monthly results in all dimensions from quality, from—you know, the capacity, the capability, the quality, the effectiveness of our recruiting programs. So we are really into the details, believe me, because this is, as we all know, the quality of the force; and the fact that it is all volunteer is very important to the country.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cole.

Mr. COLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

If I could first thank you both and thank particularly General Schoomaker for your outstanding service. It has been a pleasure every time I have had a chance to interact with you and hear you testify. You have been a great American soldier.

If I may, two areas I would like to focus on, Mr. Secretary: First, I would very much appreciate your remarks about funding the BRAC process. I know a number of us voted actually against the continuing resolution because that had been stripped out of it, and I think many of our colleagues who voted for it, had they had the opportunity to vote separately on that item or amend it, would have certainly restored those funds. So I am hopeful, going forward, we could find a way to do that.

But could you tell us in some detail, perhaps mentioning specific installations, if you like, or whatever what the impact will be if that does not occur?

Secretary HARVEY. Well, you know, in this regard there is a near-term impact and then there is, you know, a cascading effect which will impact what is planned in outyears. Specifically, in Fiscal Year 2007, there are a number of training ranges in the Fiscal Year 2007 BRAC. There are a number of training barracks, there are a number of family centers, quality-of-life-related projects that would be—that would be impacted if, in fact, the numbers that we have are—that the Army BRAC funding could be reduced by two billion dollars. And I think I mentioned that in my opening statement.

So we have a list of specific projects. We can submit that for the record with the details. Believe me, we know this in many details, but it is in those general categories of quality of life, training ranges, training barracks and so forth.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 75.]

Mr. COLE. If I may ask you on a different subject, but sort of a similar thrust. I am very pleased to see your request on the future combat system what you are asking for. I know we used that as a little bit of a cost saver last year. We didn't give you everything that you asked for in terms of funding. I know that impacts your ability to move ahead on a really critical program of modernization.

So I would ask you, relating to the future combat system, what would be the impact if we did not fully fund your request in terms of meeting your goals and time line? And then one very parochial question because Fort Sill is in my district, I am always interested in the—I have got a lot of soldiers that want a new platform. If you could address that, I will be very grateful.

Secretary HARVEY. We won't ever touch it. No, seriously—

Mr. COLE. I will take that as a commitment. Thank you very much.

Secretary HARVEY. There has been—very unfortunately, there has been almost \$800 million in cuts to the program. And that is really the primary reason why we made the decision to reduce the number of our systems, the number of total manned and unmanned systems, from 18 to 14. And we did that in order to fit the financial profile and to be able to—to start to spin out the technologies and the current force, and also to be able to—in the future, to be able to deploy a FCS brigade combat team. We had to delay that a year, and then we had to reduce the scope.

Now—and we didn't cancel those other four programs. We just, in a sense, delayed them for reconsideration because in our modeling simulation, 14 is not as good as 18; it is a different capability.

The core capability, we believe, is maintained, but we may in the future, depending on as we advance and get lessons learned and do our gaming, we may come back and then try to restore those four systems.

We have kind of deferred them. We haven't canceled them, but we are trying to fit a financial profile. We are trying to look at the reality of what is going on. We didn't have enough money to continue those, so put those on hold and kind of reprogrammed the action.

I just can't emphasize how important this program is to the future of the Army. We have done many analyses in preinsurgencies and insurgencies, and the FCS clearly brings superiority and specific operational and technical advantages to the counterinsurgency.

We recently had an event in Iraq called Black Sunday, which happened in April of 2004, in which a platoon was providing convoy security in Sadr City. It was attacked by insurgents. Two soldiers were killed, a number of Humvees were destroyed.

A battalion went on a rescue mission. It took them three hours and three attempts, because they couldn't find them, they didn't know where they were. They didn't know what streets were blocked. Six more soldiers were killed and 50 more were wounded: Black Sunday, Sadr City, April 2004.

We took the scenario and then did a model simulation with FCS capable and FCS unit of action in our model and simulation labs in Fort Knox and Fort Leavenworth. Zero soldiers are killed, zero wounded. It took one hour, not three hours.

I know that is a war gaming exercise, but that is an important indicator that FCS saves soldiers' lives because it keeps them mounted in a close fight longer, and it gives them what it is like to see first and act first. And we are going to be running a series of these exercises, taking insurgency- and preinsurgency-type operations. Here is what actually happened and here is what will happen with an FCS-capable force. Very informative.

I would be more than happy in the future—we did this one; we are doing four more—to update you and the committee on that. We think this is the capability for the future.

Mr. COLE. I thank you.

General SCHOOMAKER. If I could just add a little, a little bit different twist, while the 15 FCS brigades that are currently projected aren't the only thing that the Army benefits from. The FCS program also has technology spinouts onto the current force, and what you—what FCS really is is a modernization strategy that enables the entire force, not just the 15 FCS brigades, robotics precision, situational awareness, UAV sensors. All of these kinds of things enable all of the other brigades in the Army, as we spin this out; so that is a very, very important component of what we are talking about.

And quite frankly, you know, if you were—you asked what is the impact. If we don't continue pursuing this future strategy of modernization, what we will do is continue to chase our tail like what Congressman Taylor is talking about. We will be trying to upgrade legacy things beyond their abilities to keep up with the adaptations

that are taking place on the battlefield today. And so this is very important.

The second thing is, when you compare the expense of going for the technologies, the expense of carrying legacy systems into the future and trying to maintain these aging hulls and aging systems and all of that manpower, that is not displaced by technology so it ends up being much more expensive to take the legacy Army forward than it does to invest in the future and get the advantages that the technology brings to us.

So it is fundamental to the future of the Army, in my view, and I don't think we can overstate how important it is and we continue to pursue that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and before I address the Secretary and the General, is there a possibility that we could do just a full hearing on FCS, because I think what we are hearing here is vitally important; and I know in reading and being involved with it—

The CHAIRMAN. In answer to the gentleman, we can either do it in full committee or within the proper subcommittee. Good idea. That falls into the category sometimes, Mr. Reyes, of what Mark Twain meant when he said, the more explained to me, the more I don't understand.

And I have asked the Secretary and the General questions on the FCS in the past, and it may be a good idea to follow through on your suggestion.

Mr. REYES. I think it would be a good idea. And can I have my full five minutes now?

Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your recent visit and all of your visits to Fort Bliss in White Sands. They are very important to our region and to the men and women that serve proudly there. We appreciate that very much.

And, as well, you, too, General Schoomaker. I regret you are going to be leaving in April. But thank you for the times you have come out to El Paso, Fort Bliss, White Sands, and for your leadership—both of your leaderships in the FCS program, because in my visits to Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan, because it is a different environment, but certainly to Iraq and Baghdad, if we had some of those capabilities that FCS—the FCS program represents, it would make a huge difference, I think, in our ability to carry out operations there.

I know in discussing some of the challenges that our troops face there, it really, I think, underscores why this is a program that we have to pursue.

So you have my full support on it. And, hopefully, we will have a hearing exclusively on FCS.

I have a question, General Schoomaker, on the President's proposal for the increase of 20,000 troops, 21,000 troops into Baghdad. And the reason I ask you this question is to better understand whether or not we are able to do these kinds of things and, in particular, these five brigades.

As I understood it, when the President announced it, the 82nd got orders to go in right away. Were they fully operationally



equipped, all of the armor, all of the necessary equipment that they needed when they started into Iraq?

General SCHOOMAKER. When they entered Iraq they were.

Now, there were things that had to be done during the reception, staging, onward=movement and integration (RSOI). I process the reception staging integration process that takes place in Kuwait. But the brigade that you are talking about was sitting in what we call our roll back (RB) status, so they were in an elevated status level of readiness to respond and they did. But they were ready to respond worldwide, not just to Iraqi kinds of situations, but to other things; therefore, when they were sent, they would be focused on where they were. They have joined their equipment and, in fact, crossed the berm ready?

The—you called it the President's "proposal" to add 20,000 troops. It is not a proposal when it comes to us. It is an order to certify brigades, and that is what we are doing. We are on the supply side of the issue. The feeder has an operational plan that required these additional forces, and our job is to provide them, and we are doing it to the best of our ability.

Mr. REYES. When you say to the "best of our ability"—and I ask this question based on a number of people who have expressed concern that we are having to scurry to bring all of these four additional brigades up to full, equipped capability—how much time is it going to take and what kinds of shortfalls are there that we are having to scurry to fulfill?

General SCHOOMAKER. First of all, we are in an unclassified setting here, so I am going to be nonspecific. But again, I testified previously that I was concerned about the strategic depth in the Army. We are now supplying more; therefore, we have an additional challenge on the strategic depth.

Obviously, we are not going to put any force into theater that isn't properly trained and equipped. Therefore, "scurry" is a kind word in terms of, you know, the machinations we go through to make this happen. But there are some issues, but they are not critical issues, and our estimation is that we will be able to provide the surge forces in the time that the theater has asked for them, and they will be properly trained, led and equipped when they arrive.

Mr. REYES. And the last question: You are in full agreement with this strategy—

General SCHOOMAKER. I am in full agreement.

Mr. REYES [continuing]. For the additional brigades?

General SCHOOMAKER. I provided my advice at the time the advice was asked for. I did that. You know, I don't talk about the advice that I give to the President of the United States, but he has made a decision and we are now executing it.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, General, and thank you Mr. Secretary. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

And, General, I will add my thanks to everybody else for your many years of terrific service and make the comments with your

second retirement coming up, I feel even older as there are very few soldiers and Marines left serving that I have felt proud to call my contemporaries through those many years of service, and I really am feeling old today.

But thank you and God bless you and Godspeed.

I have a small nit to pick here if I could—I think with you, Mr. Secretary.

Last year we had asked my former colleague, Congressman Gutknecht had inserted into the Defense Authorization Act a request for a report on the impact of an assignment incentive pay issue having to do with the national guard.

It seems that if your previous service was in Kosovo, you were treated in one way; if your previous service was in Bosnia, you were treated another way. It impacts around 400 or so guardsmen in Minnesota, and so this is my appeal to you to please check on the status of that report which was frankly due more than six months ago and see if you can come back to us on that issue. It is an unanswered question in the State of Minnesota.

Secretary HARVEY. I can blame it on the staff, because I have never seen it.

Mr. KLINE. I was sure that you hadn't seen it. The rascally staff will do it. But if you could get that in, I would appreciate it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 76.]

Mr. KLINE. A question and a comment, I suppose, on the increase in the end strength of the Army, something that I have certainly been begging for and calling for, along with our chairman and former chairman. I think it is absolutely the right thing to do.

I appreciate very much, Mr. Secretary, your comments on looking at some of the waivers and so forth, but what I want to ask about is the recruiting effort and recruiting budget.

I haven't looked at the number and gone that far down. But I would hope that we are putting enough money in that effort, as my friend and colleague and former commandant of the Marine Corps used to say, "The all-volunteer force is an all-recruited force." I understand that. I know that you do. That means when you are increasing the requirements for the recruiters, you have to increase their budget and their message and hire somebody to make good ads and all of that sort of thing.

Are we—

Secretary HARVEY. I am absolutely confident. As you know, we changed our advertising campaign, advertising slogan, "Army Strong."

Mr. KLINE. Congratulations.

Secretary HARVEY. So there is an example of what we are doing and the many initiatives that we take. I have not a very good reputation with our financial management people because if any time in this monthly meeting somebody comes in and asks for money, they get it. And the order is, if you have to reprogram, program, program it, make sure it is in the budget.

So we don't want to be pennywise and pound foolish when it comes to this, and that is a fundamental principle that I have, and we have reprogrammed much money in—just as of last week. The guard identified some additional moneys they want; they will get

it. So we are very, very sensitive and conscious of the need to do that.

We were highly successful last year. We recruited across the three components 175,000 soldiers. It is important that we do that.

So the chief and I have our hands very, very tightly on that, and we are not going to not do anything. In that regard, we are also growing the officer corps, and we are going to increase the number of reserve officer training cadet (ROTC) scholarships. We have a lot of initiatives going on. You can't grow the Army. You have to grow and develop leaders. So all of those things are really pieced together.

And just to Mr. Cole's comment, we also have to provide the barracks and all of the rest of this stuff. So as you grow the Army, you had better have the basing and you had better have the barracks and headquarters so that, all placed together, they are intimately related and we manage that as an integrated whole.

Mr. KLINE. Two final comments very quickly—and, General, if you have something to comment: I share Mr. Cole's concern about whacking the defense budget on this BRAC MILCON, and I certainly hope we will rectify that. I know he and I and many members of this committee have been working very hard to do this.

And then the other thing is, if you run into difficulties, if you are recruiters and your selection officers start running into difficulties on access to campuses and other places where they need to go, I hope you will communicate with us. That is absolutely unacceptable.

General SCHOOMAKER. If I could add a couple of things here: First of all, we have a very, very tight-knit plan to grow the Army, and it is very dependent upon the facilities that are inside that BRAC, the \$2 billion that right now is in question in BRAC; and without that money, it is going to be very difficult. Remember, the BRAC and our MILCON was all put together before we were going to grow the Army, so now we have an added burden to make sure this thing comes together quickly.

The second point I would like to make, as the chairman has said, he said Ted Stroop in 1994 talked about growing the Army by 40,000. The Army today—active, guard and reserve—is only 40 percent of the size it was at the end of the Cold War. And so when Ted Stroop was talking about growing the force, the force was much larger than it is today.

The third point I would like to make is that, again, we have talked many times about the challenge we have democratically in the country. Only 3 out of 10 young men between the ages of 17 and 24 can qualify for all of the criteria to join the Armed Forces today. It is a very competitive market out there, and I would be very surprised if we are not—in fact, I know of nowhere we are not being supported fully to compete both in advertising and in incentives and all of the rest of the stuff out there to recruit, because it is a very demanding market. The challenge is very big.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. General Schoomaker, one quick question and a little longer question.

I am somebody who in Vietnam took advantage of the GI Bill and I enlisted for 2 years in the Marine Corps and got out early and still got 45 months of GI benefits.

I have a couple of Iraq war veterans on my staff, both Army Reserve. One would like to go to graduate school, but he came back from this mobilization for almost 18 months in the first run-up to Baghdad and now is out of the Army Reserve. He gets zero educational benefit.

A lot of us feel that the reserve component GI bill was really established for a peacetime situation. Do you share the concerns of Members of both the House and the Senate that we need to revisit this issue on losing the educational benefit once they are out of the reserve component?

General SCHOOMAKER. I am sorry to say that I am not as informed as I ought to be on exactly all of the benefits in that.

Dr. SNYDER. Let me do that as a statement for the record. Would you be up to speed on that? That is an important issue.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 74.]

Dr. SNYDER. I want to get into the bigger issue on this debate that we have got going on now. I was watching some of the speeches yesterday. Mr. Murphy did a very eloquent job in support of the resolution that is on the floor as an Iraq war veteran. Mr. Wilson did a very eloquent job as a proud father of four sons that we are all proud of.

I would say Mr. Cole gave a very articulate speech, but he kept referring to Stephanie Herseth in the Speaker's chair as "Mr. Speaker," but aside from that—

Mr. COLE. I was nervous.

Dr. SNYDER. Here are my concerns with the resolution I am still trying to sort through my thinking on.

It is a very simple resolution that says the Congress disapproves of the more than 20,000 troops being added. And you expressed your views earlier. It seems to me the part that has been working is the military component. The part that we are all struggling with as a nation is the nation-building component of it.

And when it came out recently that the State Department asked the military to help fund their State—or supply their State Department staff, because they can't get people in these jobs in Iraq—what a damning of this country that here we are in the fourth year of the war and we can't get people over there to do the nation-building of it. We have problems with the diplomatic side of it. We have problems with the contractual side of it, where all of the money is going for the rebuilding. General Eikenberry was talking about the ongoing need for roads, roads, roads in Afghanistan.

And so my question is—and I think Mr. Kline has asked about this question before—how do you see—you are winding down here now for the second time in your military service. A lot of us have great concerns about the support from the rest of government, the nonmilitary part of our government, that you all are getting in the work that you are doing overseas. Do you have any comment on that whole issue? I guess you are calling it interagency cooperation.

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, first of all, in shorthand, we use the acronym DIME—diplomatic information and military economic—as

kind of the shorthand describing the elements of national power. And I believe that you are correct; I think that as a military we have delivered and continued to deliver with these young men and women in super fashion.

It is no secret that we are frustrated by the difficulties of getting coordinated effort out of the other elements of national power. I also know this has been a subject of numerous discussions, meetings, debates, and I know that the leaders in these other elements are working hard, trying to figure out how to transform for the kind of world that we are in and the fact that they have had almost——

Dr. SNYDER. Have had almost four damn years, General.

General SCHOOMAKER. I am just telling you that I am as frustrated as the next person, and that as we go forward and we look at the strategic situation that we face, it is going to be absolutely essential that we get this right because this is the nature of conflict in the future.

Dr. SNYDER. You are winding down your career and on April 10th, April 11th, you may have some additional thoughts that you may want to provide to help this committee along. Because I appreciate the role that you play and believe in the civilian control of the military.

But we have got some work to do because the other aspects of government are holding you all back in completing your mission, and we cannot tolerate that as a nation.

Secretary Harvey.

Secretary HARVEY. I was going to add that it certainly doesn't apply to this committee, who is a very generous committee. And I am not implying any criticism because I don't know the details, but one thing is for sure: If the other elements, the other parts of the interagency are to participate, they need the resources to do it, and the resource question, at least in the way we are informed, is always a barrier.

So, you know, I don't know what the interaction of the other elements of government were there, authorizing in the appropriations committee. We only know the generosity of this committee.

I think the entire legislative and executive branch have got to get together and say, okay, what do you need and here the resources. I mean, tell us; we sit in this Chamber and we are asked, tell us what you need, get back to us. I don't know what goes on in the other committees, but I think it is going to be a partnership between the executive and legislative branch that solves this problem because, to your to your observation, it is 4 years. So resources are an important ingredient in all of this.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder, it is interesting that over a year ago I raised this very issue at the White House and received assurances from the Secretary of State that she would fix it, using her words.

And I see we still have that problem continuing, that the burden falls on our military which can do things and getting other agencies, A, over there and B, involved to do their job is often very, very difficult.

I appreciate you raising that issue.

Dr. SNYDER. Can you imagine what General Schoomaker's reaction would be to hear one of your comments be, hey, by the way, I am going to be a third or half short in the personnel I need even though we are in the third or fourth year of this war? It would not be tolerated.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

One other comment: Mr. Cole mentioned the BRAC process. This will be covered and, as we understand it, fully funded in the supplemental that is upcoming. And I know we are all interested in following that because it means a great deal to our military to do that, and we are going to—we are assured that will be covered in the upcoming supplement. So we will look forward to that in a positive vein.

Thank you for mentioning that. I appreciate your comments on that.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Secretary and General, thank you for being here today. I appreciate the reference by Dr. Snyder. I am very proud that I have three sons in your command. And each one of them is a better person because of the training they have received, the opportunities. One served in Iraq for a year, another in Egypt, and again it has just been very meaningful to our family.

Additionally, I am very grateful. I represent Fort Jackson. General Schwitters and his team are making such a difference for the young people who are serving there.

I also have had the perspective of being a member of the Army Reserves and Army National Guard for 31 years. And as I visited with our groups in Iraq six times, Afghanistan twice, I am always impressed by the new greatest generation. These young people are so dedicated, so capable; and thank you for what you do to help train them to protect our country.

I do share concerns as Congressman Reyes. As we are discussing the reinforcements for General Petraeus, it has been stated that our troops do not have body armor. They don't have proper uparmored Humvees or even helmets. I would like again a restatement—indeed, the persons outside the wire, people who are in harm's way, surely family members need to know that their young people are fully equipped.

Secretary HARVEY. Let me answer that.

We have a detailed process by which we identify the equipment needs of deployed and deploying forces. We refer to it as the Army Resource and Requirements Board process, involving high levels of three-star generals in the Army staff.

The needs of the five brigades that are part of the so-called surge have been evaluated, analyzed, and I can assure you that they have—they will have all of the force protection equipment required when they enter into the theater of operation.

We have identified that there are approximately 500 medium and large trucks which they will be short of, but we have talked to the commanders in theater. There are 8,000 of these trucks in theater, and we will be able to share and cross-level, so you will not have any impact on operations; and those trucks will be made available in the June time frame.

So we have a great detail on the equipment needs of every deploying unit. And they do not enter the theater or the area of their responsibility. They may be following in on equipment. So when they get to wherever they are assigned to, they are fully trained, fully manned and fully equipped. And we follow that intensely.

General SCHOOMAKER. When it comes to personal soldier equipment, I can absolutely guarantee you that we have not only manufactured, but we have issued sufficient equipment for every soldier. Not only those that go outside the wire, but those that are inside the wire have body armor, they have the advanced combat helmet, they have the proper first aid kit. They have everything that—I mean, they have the very best that we have ever issued.

And, in fact, I think I am reaching, but what I would like to give you for the record is what we have manufactured, what we have issued and what we have, but I just—because I know it is something like over 600,000 individual sets of this equipment. We are in a totally different posture today than we were even 3 years ago in terms of what personnel equipment is. This is the very finest body armor that can be manufactured; and I won't talk about it, the specific characteristics of it, here because it is classified, but let me tell you it is the best I have ever seen.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 75.]

Mr. WILSON. I know the family members appreciate it.

The Army National Guard is undergoing the largest deployment ever. The 218th is going to Afghanistan to train, and it is my former unit.

What are the prospects for training the Afghan Army? Is it positive?

General SCHOOMAKER. I was just over there at Christmas time. Went through their training centers, their academies. I think it is fantastic what General Durbin and the Afghan National Army are doing, and they are performing very well on the battlefield. They are—they are receiving their equipment, the training is first class, and I think it is quite a model.

Secretary HARVEY. Let me also add that General Durbin was back in the building last week, met with both the chief and myself. Talked to him at length. He has made tremendous progress in capacity and capability.

He is also in charge now of the Iraq—excuse me, of the Afghan national police, standing them up. There is currently on the order—these are round numbers—of 100,000 security forces between the army and the police on their way to about 150,000. And he has a detailed plan. As a matter of fact, in the Fiscal Year 2007 or Fiscal Year 2008 GWOT request there is \$5.8 billion for the Afghan security forces because he is really—he has really increased the number capability.

They have got the proper infrastructure, they have got academies, they actually have a mini-West Point. They are really making great progress.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being before us today.

When Secretary Gates testified before us last week, he said—aside from Iraq and Afghanistan, he pointed out several other concerns, global concerns, that he had, including Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. In looking at the Army's budget, I am trying to understand, in your base budget, how much is that dedicated toward the situation we have in Iraq and Afghanistan and how much is demonstrated to these other global concerns? And in the proposed war budget, is that all just for Iraq and Afghanistan or do we have some contingency for the global concerns in there? And for the supplemental war budget, what would be the breakdown?

The basic question is, should something else get out of hand, are we going to be able to handle that from a financial standpoint in the budget that we have before us, or will we require another supplemental to do something, if something happens in North Korea, for example, or one of these other places that Secretary Gates was talking about?

General SCHOOMAKER. Let me start, and the Secretary can give you some specifics.

In general, the base budget is designed to fund the Army for the full spectrum of responsibility that we have, not just for Iraq, Afghanistan and global war on terror. The supplemental funds are principally designed to fund the level of operation reset and the kinds of things we are doing.

So I would say, as a general rule, and we would have to look very carefully, but I think that I am absolutely correct in that regard.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are you saying that the base budget is just for our standing Army, regardless, and then our supplementals and our war supplementals budget are for Iraq and Afghanistan in particular?

General SCHOOMAKER. The base budget is designed to fund the Army on a consistent basis for what the Army does across all requirements, to include Iraq and Afghanistan and to include funds if something happens in another arena.

The supplemental obviously is written by things like reset and the levels of operation over there. The budget today is going to produce things several years from now. I mean, one of the things that we have to understand is, there is latency in the system dollars we drop today to produce things and produce results in 18 months, 3 years from now.

So we largely are going to deal with today's problems with what we have today. And I have testified that I have my concerns about the strategic depth of the Army.

I also know that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the rest of us chiefs, has submitted his risk assessment, which is classified. And it is here on the Hill, so you can read in detail about where those risks are. I know the Secretary of Defense also has to submit a mitigating strategy for the Chairman's risk assessment.

So what I am saying here is, what we are dealing with today we are dealing with investments that we made previously. What we are talking about today in terms of the future will produce future results and it really now falls into kind of a classified realm. And I know it is available to you, and if you would look at it, it would give you some insights into specifically where you are.



Ms. SANCHEZ. If you could let me know where the documents are, so I could take a look at that. I am concerned from the fact of what if something flares up, how are we going to fund that, or are you going to have to come back to Congress for immediate funds of the sort?

General SCHOOMAKER. I think if there was another operation that went up, there would be additional funding needed to do that.

Secretary HARVEY. One of the major challenges that I talk about and the chief talks about all the time is what we call "achieving full spectrum readiness." if you look at the spectrum of conflict, the focus in Iraq and Afghanistan is what is referred to as an insurgency, but you are talking—in many cases, the countries you talked about have the potential for major combat operations.

We know in very great detail what equipment, training, and manning we need to have a capability for full spectrum. And most of that, with some exceptions, is in the base budget. So if you look at the budgets over the last number of years up to 2013—Fiscal Year 2013—and we can provide this detail—we have a total of \$156 billion in the equipment realm to close many of the things you heard about in terms of the national guard and reserve. So there is a lot of money in the base budget to give us that full spectrum readiness.

Generally, the one-timers associated with the war or in the supplementals are in the GWOT request. But generally, that is the case. If there was another war, then you would have—you would need a supplement or a request like that because the day-to-day costs are not in just the equipment. So—when you deploy, you have the day-to-day costs so you would need something like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Dr. Gingrey, let me follow through, if I may, on that.

Actually, when you talk about full spectrum readiness, it is really a two-pronged affair: conventional and counterterrorism or counterterrorism?

Secretary HARVEY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And somewhere along the line—I won't take the time right now; I will reserve my questions—I would like for you to go into the efforts, not just the educational efforts which I am familiar with, but the training efforts on the counterterrorism, counterterrorism. But I will ask you that later.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you. Secretary, General Schoomaker, I thank both of you for your service and I congratulate General Schoomaker for his distinguished career and congratulate him on his retirement.

Mr. Chairman, I am glad this question of base budgeting came up, because I wanted to make a comment in regard to the BRAC issue and that was mentioned a little earlier by several of my colleagues. In fact, you know, that was a situation of taking from the base budget, the 2007 base budget, something like \$2.5, \$3 billion and saying, we are going to spend that money on something else that seemed to have a higher priority in this so-called continuing resolution.

I don't question some of the needs there, but I certainly question the priorities.

So now we are looking at a situation where funding that needed BRAC money will be in an emergency supplemental, which to me seems a little inappropriate. Of course, none of us would vote against that, I don't think, on either side of the aisle. So it is a good opportunity to say that we need to watch these base budgets pretty carefully when you start shifting money around.

My good friend, Dr. Snyder, brought up some real legitimate concerns in his line of questioning concerned with the other agencies, and I would like to point out—he wasn't actually at this meeting this morning, but a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State—I believe her name was Mrs. Barbara Stevenson—for Iraq, pointed out to us that these provisional reconstruction teams, something like 66 out of 67 slots had been filled and are actually—some of these people are already embedded with the troops as we had this temporary increase.

So certainly we have got some concerns, but where—I think we indeed are addressing those.

My question specifically was about medical personnel; as a physician member, I am very concerned about that. I was out in Bethesda recently visiting with a Navy corpsman, Dustin Kirby, who was shot in the face by a sniper as he was trying to save the life of, as he put it, one of his Marines. As he put it, Mr. Secretary and General Schoomaker, we know how important they are, and it is not just physicians, but these medics and these corpsmen.

What are we doing to increase recruitment and retention of these very, very vital individuals?

Secretary HARVEY. To my knowledge, we do not in the Army—I can only speak to the Army. In the Army we do not have a shortage of the medics. You know, their military occupational specialty (MOS) number used to be 91 Whiskey; now they have changed it to 68 Whiskey. But to my knowledge, we don't have a shortage of those. And one thing we are doing in the training arena, both to enhance the quality of training and also to do that in the most efficient manner is that the Army, Navy, and Air Force are consolidating training of the medics down at Fort Sam Houston.

So all of the medical service and support personnel will be trained there, which is a quality and, I think, an efficiency point of view. If there is—we will certainly get that back for the record.

But from my personal knowledge, we are okay in terms of that capability which, as you noted, is invaluable on the battlefield and back here at home. They are very talented and extremely dedicated individuals who take care of our wounded day in and day out, and they do it in an enthusiastic manner and they keep the enthusiasm and positive attitude of the soldiers up.

So I totally agree, it is a very important group of people.

General SCHOOMAKER. If I could address very quickly the combat medics; the combat medic of today is totally different from the combat medic of yesterday. And the 91 Whiskey, which I now believe is 68 Whiskey, trained at Fort Sam Houston where we have a massive system down there which is world class. It is an emergency medical technician (EMT) certified medic, the equivalent of what you have in emergency medical service in major cities, and they maintain their national certification. They have to be recertified every two years. This is a very high-quality medic.

Below them, the individual soldiers, we have what is called a Combat Lifesaver Program, and it is our goal to maximize within a platoon—for instance, every individual that goes to combat have lifesavers, which is largely taught at their institution. And when you take a look at the equipment that the individual soldier carries today, the individual first aid kit with the special bandages, one-arm tourniquets and things, it is a very sophisticated first aid kit compared to yesterday.

People ought to feel very good about the direction we are going in this regard, and I think it is a world-class program.

Dr. GINGREY. And I agree. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the distinguished witnesses. I am grateful for your service for the Nation. I have been on this committee for four years now. To be frank with you, I am pretty worried. I am worried that the chief casualty of the world in Iraq is a broader transformation of our Nation's military because I think a lot of changes are probably overdue.

I look at the testimony, not only today, but in prior years, and I think we are probably better at interservice rivalry than we are at reforming our procurement process so we can get the equipment we need on time. I am a little bit worried that we are better at bureaucracy than we are at understanding the nature of the enemy.

One chart, on page three, the defense allocation by service, which basically shows level percentages for each service for the last half century, and that looks to me like an unresponsive military system when we have been unchallenged at air and sea for a half century.

The Army infantry is taking 96 percent of the casualties and has for the last half century. So I am seeing—what worries me is kind of an unresponsive military system.

I am not faulting you. That may not be humanly possible within today's system, but I want to explore with you and with your successors ways of making our military a little bit more agile and responsive to the threats that we are seeing today, because I think that our enemies probably only rejoice at seeing the level of funding percentages like that, knowing each bureaucracy has its needs in place whether we have that hardware or not.

In World War II we were able to be the armory of the world, and now we have one manufacturer of one uparmored Humvee in America. Is that meeting the need?

To me, there is so much more to reform this process so that we can supply the military with absolutely everything that they need. I know it is a broad set of points and questions, but I will be happy with any response.

General SCHOOMAKER. I will be the outspoken one on this.

First of all, I respectfully disagree that we have got huge interservice rivalries. I have seen among the chiefs the best joint cooperation in all of my years of service being directly related to chiefs and what happens in the joint system. Nevertheless, there is realistic compensation between, you know, a fix-up line on things.

To go back historically, at the end of the Cold War when we went after a peace dividend, the Army was the largest bill payer in that,

and I have testified here many times that we had over 100 billion in underinvestment in the Army. That largely—and that was in the base budget, and that is largely the problem we have been trying to overcome, the thing that we call the “holes in the force” as we try to operate today.

With your help, we are fixing some of those holes in the force, but as you know, because of the level of operation, we also have combat losses and higher depreciation of equipment because of usage. So it is a problem.

So what I would—the only reason I bring this up is because I think it ought to inform us as we go to the future; we should not repeat this as we go forward. We should mix in and have a sustained level of funding.

And I have said, in my view, that we ought to be at about five percent of GDP for defense and what we ought to do is the equivalent dollar cost average and have a sustained level of resourcing that then we don't have to pay a premium as we time the market, based upon conflict.

And so I will kind of leave it there. I think that what we should not do is repeat past practices, and we must look at the strategic demand in the future, and these people that say that we are not going to have these conflicts in the future I think are really uninformed in terms of what is there.

Mr. COOPER. I am afraid you made my point because if the Army had asked for 50 percent of the DOD budget 1 year to make up for the 100 billion dollar shortfall that you suffered unfairly in the past, then you would have seen interservice rivalry break out in spades. We just seem—as long as you stay within your niche of about 25 percent of DOD budgets, then the rivalry won't be so fierce, but that makes us unresponsive to real threats and—

General SCHOOMAKER. We have always asked for more than we receive, and we—you know the process that we go through, and it is not a straight shot to the Hill. It goes through a process and in bureaucracy do what bureaucracies do. And that is one of the realities of dealing at this level.

So I will tell you that if you want to go back and track our request against the process, you will find that the Army has been aggressive in asking, at least during the period of time that I have been here, we have been aggressive in asking for what we believe was reasonable.

Secretary HARVEY. Let me also ask in terms of joint—in cooperation, we do a lot of acquisition jointly with the Navy, and the Marines in particular. You just heard about the MRAP program this morning. You look at the Joint Tactical Radio System; that is a joint program between the three services. You look at the Joint Cargo Aircraft; that is a joint program between the Army and the Air Force.

Humvee, of course, is a joint program. We buy all of the Humvees for the Marines and the Aerial Common Sensor Program—so many programs in the area of the acquisition, where we get together and we pool our resources. And the Joint High Speed Vessel program with the Navy, I can name a number of these programs.

So it is not—I think it is not all negative and bad news, and the chief and I view that as what our job is, and we are certainly asking for what the Army needs, and our feeling is that the Congress needs to take care of all of the services and all of the threats and not just looking at the Army.

We are asking for the Army needs. We are not doing that to take anything away from the Navy and the Air Force or the Marines. As a matter of fact, we work so closely with the Marines we do things together, and the chief will be testifying again like he did before this committee with the commandant.

So there is a great partnership with the land forces, and we take care of each other and look after each other's needs and do it together. So it is—maybe it is not where it should be, but it is not certainly as bad as it used to be.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mrs. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and General, thank you for being here. I can assure you, this committee would like to give you more money because we know how badly you need it.

I wanted to start by showing you this postcard. It is Iraqi Operation Freedom. It is pictures of Iraqi schoolchildren with their school supplies, and it is from a young man from the 245th Engineering Company. He says, "Thanks for supporting the troops here in Iraq. We appreciate it."

I can't tell you how I felt when I received that. I thought here is somebody who is fighting in Iraq for us taking the time to send us postcards. We should be writing them long letters and thanking them for their service. I publicly wanted you to know that is taking place.

As a Member of Congress who represents a BRAC district, I represent Fort Monroe in Virginia, I am concerned about the \$3 billion that was cut, and I know you want that money back in there, too.

Yesterday I had an opportunity to meet the ambassador from Egypt and the ambassador from Jordan. What they were here about was to talk to us about how critical it is that we not pull out of Iraq and the impact that it will have on the surrounding countries.

The question came up about training of Iraqi troops. Egypt, we understand from their ambassador, is very willing to train troops. They explained to us during the time of the temporary government, the then-minister of defense, who I am assuming was General Shaalan said no, they did not want to be trained by the Egyptians, they wanted to be trained by the Americans. But since three or four years have gone by, I am wondering if that is something we have revisited or we can look at in order to train more troops and to have more Iraqis able to be there. I completely understand they need our presence as well. They do so much better because of our presence and our training of them. But is that something we can relook at or have we relooked at it?

Secretary HARVEY. Let me answer in terms of some statistics, Congresswoman. I go back to the spring of 2005 when there was 140,000 Iraqi security forces. That is when we started in earnest.

That is when General Petraeus was the head of the Security and Transition Command.

Today there is something like 25 to 30,000 of ever increasing quality. So the capacity I think is getting there. The plan is to grow the army an additional 40,000, I believe, so the final number of security forces is 365,000.

So I think the capacity, and this has been done with a lot of our training brigades and the reserves and institutions in Iraq. They have their own recruiting and basic training basis and they have their own advanced individual training. All of that has been set up.

Maybe the need was there at one time but today I don't think the need is there. The capacity of 365 is there. The quality varies, but the quality generally has improved over the last couple of years, which is my data points.

The leadership, they have their command and general staff college. They are mimicking what the U.S. does.

It is a very good story in terms of capacity. The quality is vastly improved. It needs to be further improved. And now we are working on logistics so they can be self-sustained. A lot of great progress has gone on. I don't know if there is a need.

My recollection is there was some training going on in Jordan. My recollection is training going on in Jordan of Iraqi security forces, some specialized police training, if I am not mistaken.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say to the gentlewoman, it appears that the appropriators will solve the BRAC appropriation problem, and we look forward to that.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, we are debating this anti-surge resolution, and I will wind up voting against that just because I don't believe we ought to be sitting on the sidelines booing and naysaying in the middle of the play as that play is being executed.

One of the things that makes it awkward for me to vote against that resolution is that I have been one in our caucus, pretty much a lone voice in the caucus in recent years, who has been saying we don't need more soldiers over there, we need a different mix, that conventional forces really struggle with challenges like this. It is a normal dynamic we have repeated over time.

In order to be ultimately successful, we have to have a different mix of capacities over there and we need to be building our partner capacity on both the political and military side, and ultimately they need to do this.

As we stay there in a conventional posture doing conventional type things long enough, it is going to anger the population and anger us and eventually we will separate and it will be bad for both sides because we were not doing this the right way.

Dr. Snyder just a little while ago brought up essentially the kinds of concerns I have expressed for quite some time about our lack of capacity at partner building and networking and building political infrastructure and military infrastructure in these countries that need that infrastructure to support what we are trying to accomplish.

Chief, you have mentioned these are the wars of the future. As we see it on the horizon, we are very likely going to have to engage in this kind of thing repeatedly. And yet nobody here can say with confidence that we are going to be able to reorganize the United States Government to build the capacity we need other than in DOD. There is nothing on the horizon that suggests we are going to be able to do that.

I guess what I would like you to comment on, Chief, Mr. Secretary, how does what you are proposing in this posture statement hit DOD, the Army specifically, because the Army is on the ground and the largest presence dealing with the most difficult circumstances in these kinds of conflicts, how does this head the Army more in the direction of being able to fill those gaps, the sorts of things that we know need to be done in order for our conventional forces to have any chance at all of being successful, and that we think might not be done if we just sort of leave it to the hope that Congress is somehow going to reorganize the military government in its entirety?

General SCHOOMAKER. First of all, I will start out. We are on the most aggressive transformation of the Army since World War II. We have gone to a modular brigade structure, which is that greater situational awareness that has now embedded in the brigade the kinds of capabilities not only for full spectrum but for more at the center of the spectrum. For instance, MPs, engineers, increased intelligence capacity, the bandwidth necessary to move intelligence and to do the analysis and the reach-back. It is a different force, much more agile and much more informed. More precise, more lethal, et cetera.

As this transformation continues we will get better. In a broader sense across the Army, and if you look at the balance we have between the brigade combat teams and the other combat support brigades, we have things like these engineer units in the guard that have infantry inside them that are capable of operating in non-permissive and semi-permissive environments to do the kinds of things that you would do in the center of the spectrum of conflict.

We have increased the capabilities in our logistics infrastructure and force protection and the training we are providing those soldiers.

Additionally, we are expanding our Special Operations Forces. The Army's contribution to the USSOCOM is growing by 14,000 soldiers.

Mr. MARSHALL. Let me get you to take it from the other perspective. Flip the coin and look at it from what is not going to be there? Where are we going to be falling short?

Secretary HARVEY. Let me just take a couple of seconds.

We are growing our civil affairs function by about 3,000, and civil affairs has this broad capability in terms of establishing governance and working with the local governors and so forth.

General SCHOOMAKER. Actually doubling the civil affairs.

Secretary HARVEY. Another important thing that the Chief mentioned is that one of the principles of insurgency, intelligence drives operations, and we are increasing the number of military intelligence personnel by about 8,000 over the future. So we are increasing those skills that we need to do the insurgency.

Finally, if you look at the template for leadership that was developed by the Chief and myself a couple of years ago, one of the attributes that we are inculcating into our leaders is the ability for statesmanship, governance, cultural awareness, and language. We are morphing our leaders to be more capable and more effective in a counterinsurgency stability operation. So there are a lot of moving parts that are moving the Army to be better capable of addressing those irrespective of what goes on in the interagency.

General SCHOOMAKER. Even in high intensity warfare in the future we now know there will be an asymmetric component. People are going to school on this conflict. Even nation states that we may find ourselves as adversaries to in the future, they are now transforming themselves to have asymmetric warfare capabilities and information warfare capabilities that are much different than what we have experienced in the past. This is not just a shift toward the center of the spectrum. It is a realization that even at the top end of the spectrum, we are going to face asymmetric warfare kinds of capabilities.

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. General, if I can ask you a question that Mr. Skelton had mentioned, and Mr. Secretary, you kind of answered it, but looking at 2006, we met accessions, but we were 17 percent below new recruit contracts. And since 2004 to 2006, the trend has been an 11 percent drop in accessions, as you know, but with high school diplomas. And that the percentage of those in the above average mental category scoring has dropped 11 percent since 2004.

Mr. Secretary, like you said, we are just below four percent in those that we access in the Category four area and the maximum we can do is four percent by DOD policy. But two years ago it was at half a percent.

I agree that the national treasures sitting behind you are the best there is, but if these statistics are not treated as a snapshot in comparing to 1980 but rather as good military leaders you try to prevent a crisis from happening, rather than trying to lead us out of a crisis, if this were to be the same two years from now, another 11 percent drop, the trend, would you be concerned if this trend continues, particularly in view that the recruit quality in 2007 has not increased and yet we are asking for another 65,000 troops?

I am not asking to compare it to 1980, I am asking the trend, particularly with an Army that is increasingly dependent on FCS and capability by the best and brightest?

Secretary HARVEY. Let me start out on the four percent. I made that decision, and I will tell you what statistic I used.

My recollection was a couple of years ago the Category four, and remember there is a Category five and we don't do that. Category four, we were running historically about two percent. I asked the reason why we supposedly had the two percent objective and the DOD standard was four percent. I never got an answer to that. Here is the answer I did get. I got the answer that about 12 to 13 percent of our today's command sergeant majors, the top of our NCO corps, the best NCO corps in the world, scored on Category four when they were assessed.



Mr. SESTAK. The trend, if it is continuing another 2 years from now to 11 percent decrease in high school diplomas, and if this trend continues 2 years from now, will you be concerned?

Secretary HARVEY. No, because you either have a high school degree or a graduate equivalency degree (GED) equivalent.

There was a study, and that to us is not a quality indicator, that is an attrition or staying—there was a study a couple of years ago, maybe five or six years ago, that said the propensity to stay in was higher if you had a high school degree. Our accessions, people have looked at that time and time again.

Mr. SESTAK. Why don't we do away with that statistic then? If it doesn't matter, why should we care?

Secretary HARVEY. We should look at it. We need a high school equivalent. We don't want to have non-high school equivalents.

Mr. SESTAK. If these trends in the mental category, that an 11 percent increase in those being tested now, two years ago, less are in the above average mental category and those other trends?

General SCHOOMAKER. Obviously we want to recruit the highest quality force we can recruit, and I would be happier if the trend was in the other direction. But I would remind you that the law allows us to recruit 20 percent of Cat 4s. We are talking about four percent of—we are operating at a four percent window here that is a very, very high quality of force.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir. We are also talking about 11 percent less with high school diplomas.

General SCHOOMAKER. The bigger issue is this. We don't control the demographics of the population. I spoke a moment ago about how challenging this recruiting environment is. We are now in the sixth year of war. Three out of ten young men in the primary—this is an issue in this country.

Mr. SESTAK. Why have you only asked for \$125 million in recruiting money this year in the budget, and last year we spent \$860 million?

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Sestak, your time has expired.

Mr. Johnson.

General SCHOOMAKER. We will get you the right number. That is not a right number.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 77.]

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. To follow up on Congressman Sestak's questions, assuming that the Congress moves forward with increasing end strength, does the Department intend to take action to add the resources necessary to improve recruit quality, and I think it is clear from what I have read that your recruit quality is on the downstroke, or should Congress simply expect further erosion in recruit quality?

Secretary HARVEY. I respectfully disagree that the recruit quality is going down. It is the highest quality force we have ever had. We talked about—our primary quality indicators is the so-called ASVAB, the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. I am very satisfied.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am asking do you have the resources that you need?

Secretary HARVEY. We do. We recruited 175,000 people last year with the resources, and to my knowledge we haven't changed those resources. You may have to look at the combination of the base budget and the supplementals. In fact, our advertising campaign is more expensive than it was last year.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is it geared toward increasing recruit quality?

Secretary HARVEY. Let me say that I and the Chief as previously testified, we are satisfied with the quality of this force with four percent Category fours.

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. I won't belabor you on that point. I thank both of you gentlemen for making it through the elements today to come to share testimony with us.

Regarding our outstanding Army medical personnel, what is the Army leadership doing to improve the recruiting and retention of medical professionals in the Army? And given the proposed increase in end strength, how will the military to civilian conversions affect the medical support on the battlefield?

Secretary HARVEY. To my knowledge we are doing—now this is not the medics, this is the doctors. Is that what you are talking about, the docs and the nurses?

Mr. JOHNSON. All medical professionals.

Secretary HARVEY. To my knowledge we are not having a general problem with medical professionals. Now one proposal under consideration is to reduce the so-called mandatory service obligation of medical professionals to attract them so they don't have to stay in for eight years. That is a proposal that is under discussion to incentivize or attract more medical professionals.

In terms of military-civilian conversions, there have been many studies which level conversion you can do in the medical community. There is for sure one thing: We need enough medical doctors in theater and in operations, so we pay very close attention to having enough in the system to do that. If you have too many civilians, obviously, they can't be deployed and they can't go to some of these dangerous situations. So there are studies along those lines. We have guidelines and we will never convert more military doctors to civilians that will jeopardize our ability to do that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

There is no question that retention programs are becoming increasingly expensive. They will remain under stress during Fiscal Year 2007. What is the expected impact on Army retention of the President's proposal to increase end strength in Iraq?

Secretary HARVEY. The quarterly retention numbers are all exceeding their objective in both the active, guard, and reserve. They are exceeding what the objective is. Last year we retained about 130,000 soldiers. This year it is in the same range, 125,000–130,000. When we have this recruiting meeting the Chief and I talked about, we also look at retention.

Again, the highest retention rates are in those units that have deployed or recently deployed. For example, the 10th Mountain Division, a third of the 10th was just extended. They have exceeded by their retention goal by 162 percent. So right now there is certainly no problem with retention, and it is highest with the deployed or recently deployed units.

Dr. SNYDER. Your time has expired, Mr. Johnson.

We are going to go another round.

Mr. Hunter is recognized for as much time as he needs.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't want to keep you gentlemen here longer than is necessary. But let me just make one remark with respect to my friend from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak, who talked about high school educations. You responded back with some statements about GEDs.

I believe the most successful businessman in the history of the United States Congress, who happens to be my seat mate in San Diego, Darrell Issa, a gentleman to whom I am looking forward to getting some loans from shortly, was a high school dropout who joined the United States Army and received a GED while in the United States Army and developed a profession and expanded that profession into one of the most successful business ventures in the world.

I have always admired, Mr. Secretary, and General Schoomaker, you exude the warrior ethos and the idea of can-do opportunity and the desire to make yourself better and stronger and more educated, all of the things that I think a lot of young people aspire to when they go into the Army. I think a lot are not sure exactly what they want to do. But the Army gives such a broad array of opportunities now, and if you look at the all of the MOSs and all of the career paths that can emanate from those MOSs in the civilian sector, it is a great opening door. And it is one that I think makes better citizens out of folks who come out of our communities.

I just say to my colleagues, I don't think we should describe the top three out of ten young people in this country anything below, that is the other seven out of ten, as being losers simply because they can't make the United States Army qualifications. They don't qualify.

You know, we have all seen the anecdotal stories about the fact, and I think the gentleman who owns the spurs, Pete Holt, I don't know if you know Pete, but the legend about Pete Holt was that he was not a sterling citizen as a young man but joined the United States Army and went to Vietnam and did very well over there as an enlisted man and came back and became a giant in industry. In fact I was out with Pete the other day. He was taking a lot of our wounded guys hunting near San Antonio, Texas.

So the fabric of this country is interwoven with people who have found their path in the United States Army, as well as I might say the other services. There is a certain coming together that is found in the military services that is not replicated in any other institution in this country.

So I believe it is the Army of opportunity and because there is so much technical focus now that it does open the door to an array of civilian prospects. Of course that is always going to be a problem because you have talented folks that see more money and more stay at home time and maybe more time with the family in the civilian areas, so getting those reenlistments will always be challenging.

But I see a bright future for the Army. I don't see enlistments going down. I think a lot of that depends on what we do. We have all talked a little about this resolution that is before us. I think personally that this resolution is going to be demoralizing. I think

that anything we do is seen and observed by our enemies and by our friends and I think by our troops. I have read some letters this morning, everybody has their letters. I have read letters this morning by folks that think that we are letting them down, folks in the theater wearing the uniform. I think it is wrong for us, once we have made a decision to undertake an operation, a military operation and the operation is already underway because you have elements of the 82nd Airborne already basically executing this mission, the idea that we retroactively condemn the mission is something that I think has never been done in the history of this country. I don't think that it is going to raise the morale of our troops.

About on the other hand, I know they are pretty tough people.

Just one last thing. Last time Mr. Reyes and I were in Balad, and as you know, Mr. Secretary, we were always after the commanding officer (CO) about those armored vehicles. The CO was showing some of the armored vehicles outside, and you had a couple of the obligatory mortar rounds come in a couple of thousand meters away while we were there. The General rushed us into the nearest building which was a movie theater. I opened the doors and there were 400 GIs in there having a Baptist church service totally oblivious to this mortar attack outside. One hundred GIs were on the stage singing, and the preacher was talking and Congress actually got forced to go to church, Members of Congress forced to go to church by gunfire, and we had to get the full message before we could leave. We didn't escape.

But the sermon was about keeping your family together while you are in the military. It was a great sermon. I reflected on the fact that my morale was raised by going to Iraq far above the level it had been here with lots of naysayers in Washington, D.C.

Thanks for your service. You have been steering a very important ship for this country, that great body that has seen us through a lot of tough and difficult times.

I think you are also creating lots of character, lots of great Americans with character who will serve us well throughout this society. The Army is really a producer of character. That is what makes America run. So thanks a lot.

Thanks for your endurance, General Schoomaker. That rope is on its way. We will have it for you shortly.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. Sestak, five minutes.

Mr. SESTAK. Please, General, on my last comment, I entered the military during Vietnam and lived through the 1980's that you spoke about, and I saw us put a lot of money and attention in trying to get the best and the brightest and I know the dog hasn't barked yet. My comment isn't to say that it is not a wonderful, diverse force.

I just think best leaders look at trends, and the dog hasn't barked, but if the money isn't needed any longer to try to get the best and the brightest and if that is not our focus, I was just curious about that. Please take it that way.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sure.

Mr. SESTAK. General, it is always tough to balance competing priorities. If you had, or if you are able to say or felt comfortable

at saying, if you had to put more money into the concern you have expressed twice today on strategic depth, or the billions that are needed to place 20,000 troops in Iraq, where would you have put that money?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, you know, it is not my choice.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir. But I was just asking.

General SCHOOMAKER. This Nation can afford to do both. Since we are at war and since the Commander in Chief has made a decision that I support, we have to put our priorities on those soldiers that are in contact with the enemy. That is where my priority would go.

I still think we have an opportunity to accelerate and which I recommend we accelerate the transformation of this force. That is why I submitted at the request of Mr. Hunter the financial requirements, and why I mentioned today the fact that there is opportunity outside this current budget so if we want to accelerate we could.

Mr. SESTAK. Are there any changes to BRAC that have to be thought of because of the new Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)?

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes. We have. We are not reopening BRAC, but we have to think differently about the timing. It is such a closely knit plan that we are very concerned about anything that stalls that plan because it starts backing things up.

In fact, we may even have to, we may have to fold some flags that we have built; in other words, units, because we cannot move them to where we want to move them. We may have to redistribute them.

Mr. SESTAK. There were two unmanned aerial vehicles and two robotic systems that you have cancelled or delayed, I think the Secretary said. Is this of minimal or significant impact upon the capability of the FCS system?

General SCHOOMAKER. We made some decisions based on things that we have learned and additional technologies. We focused what we wanted to do on the UAV program.

Mr. SESTAK. So they are cancelled? Have you folded them in? My question is: Are they delayed or are they cancelled?

Secretary HARVEY. You mean the UAVs?

Mr. SESTAK. And the robotic systems.

Secretary HARVEY. We have deferred two of the four class. We are going to see whether or not we can move the so-called one to be more like a two, a two-one, and the four more like a four-three. But we are reserving our final decision until we see how this develops.

Mr. SESTAK. I do think the tragedy of Iraq, one of them, my belief, I could be wrong, that the transformation of the Army that was so well thought of by General Shinseki and then you took so much further has been delayed. I think Mr. Cooper had it right.

What the particulars were by putting more into that I think is something that needs to be done. I just wish it could have been done and might have been done sooner because I do worry about the strategic depth in the sense of being able to respond to other contingencies that we hope don't occur from the Western Pacific to the Middle East or to Northeast Asia.

Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am glad we are concluding on a very positive note. The references to character and opportunity of our military, the best and the brightest of the military, I truly know firsthand with our family what the military does. I told you how it has impacted our family.

My oldest son, who served for a year in Iraq, he was a pretty good student in undergraduate school, but not too good. He went to Fort Sill to artillery school, and he had computer training, multiple launch rocket systems, and he took of.

It might be shocking to Dr. Snyder, but he went on to law school because we need more attorneys. But he would not have gotten to law school if he hadn't had the impetus of his military training.

Another son went to signal school. He is now an expert in communications from Fort Gordon. I am so proud of him. He is now a superstar in selling commercial real estate in South Carolina. Again, it was the military training that had such an impact.

Additionally, our youngest son is Army ROTC at Clemson University. I know the leadership skills that he is learning. Over the weekend I was at the White Knoll High School, a Navy JROTC event. They had representatives there from Pelion High School Army ROTC, from Lexington High School Navy JROTC. It just makes you feel so good to see the opportunities for these young people.

I myself was Army ROTC at Washington and Lee University, and what I learned at JAG school at the University of Virginia, and then this is somewhat scary, I became a combat JAG in the year 2000. The 218th went for training at the National Training Center, again an extraordinary opportunity for me and the people I served with. I want to assure the American people we have the best and the brightest.

My number two son is a bit off track. He is a doctor in the Navy. He is serving in Connecticut, and I am proud of him.

I have a nephew of whom I am very proud of serving in Anchorage, Alaska, and he actually volunteered to serve there.

Thank you for your service and all of us appreciate the opportunities that are provided for the young people in the military.

Dr. SNYDER. Gentlemen, I asked you earlier about a question for the record on the GI bill. It may be quicker to have your staff call me.

One final question that is on the issue of procurement. There seems to be uniform agreement that we have a real issue on how we buy things in the military and it is a huge ship to try to turn and do things differently. One specific issue came up in our discussion with General Pace last week which was part of Goldwater-Nickles, service chiefs were essentially taken out of the chain of command when it came to procurement. Have you formed an opinion, do you think service chiefs should be put back in the chain of command when it comes to procurement issues?

General SCHOOMAKER. Service chiefs are not in the chain of command at all. We are advisers to the civilian leadership and the acquisition in the Army falls under the Secretary of the Army's purview. I provide advice freely. There are no problems there.

I will tell you this candidly. If we let the acquisition bureaucracy run at the speed it wants to run, we will never be successful in transforming and winning in the world that we are in. It has a tendency to work down to zero defects and preclude any real innovation, in my opinion.

So anybody that has any ideas about how we can streamline this, we are getting ahead not because we are moving at the pace of this acquisition bureaucracy. I am very concerned that this will again get traction and we will lose a lot of momentum if that occurs.

Dr. SNYDER. We appreciate you gentlemen for being here.

Mr. Hunter, do you have anything else?

Mr. HUNTER. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you for your service, and we look forward to working with you until April 10, General, and beyond.

General SCHOOMAKER. If I may make a confession, I was not only one of these rascals when I was a kid, but I was also not the sharpest knife in the drawer and my parents will attest to both. I don't know if I have been successful in Army and life, but the Army has made a difference. I have been very, very proud of my association with the Army and the young men and women who are in it. Thank you for the opportunity and thanks for the kind words.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]





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# **A P P E N D I X**

FEBRUARY 14, 2007

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

FEBRUARY 14, 2007

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**Chairman Skelton Statement  
Full Committee Hearing  
FY08 Department of the Army Budget Request**

“Welcome to the House Armed Services Full Committee Hearing on the FY 2008 Army Budget Request. Thank you, Secretary Harvey and General Schoomaker for appearing before us to present the Army portion of the Department of Defense budget. The Army has long needed an increase in both its end strength, that is the number of its people, and in funding to perform its role in defending the nation and prevailing in any future conflicts. I first learned this in 1995 when former General Ted Stroup testified in support of a 40,000 person increase in the size of the Army before this committee. I’ve been calling for an increase ever since. So I say to you gentlemen, you’re in good company.

“I’m encouraged that the fiscal year 2008 Army budget request of \$130 billion, a substantial \$20 billion increase over fiscal year 2007, should go a long way toward meeting the need to increase the size of the Army and support the Army’s requirements.

“The top priority I have in reviewing the Army’s budget is readiness. General Schoomaker, in July 2006 and last month, I asked you if you were comfortable with the readiness of units in the United States, and your answer both times was no. This committee intends to do everything in its power to correct that. I remain apprehensive about the effect of the Iraq troop increase upon our readiness and the related strategic risk; in other words, our ability to fight elsewhere if called upon.

“Today, the Army is engaged in two primary conflicts. I came back from a recent trip to Afghanistan optimistic, feeling that our fight there is winnable. I wish I were as optimistic about Iraq and the President’s proposed troop increase. First, the odds are slim that this change in tactics will improve the security situation in Iraq. Second, even though troops are already being sent to Baghdad to implement the President’s strategy, I am not convinced that the Administration has a solid plan in place to provide the number of support troops required to give our combat units the best chance to succeed.

“Extension or troop increase in Iraq increases the strategic risk to the United States that we may not have the right resources when our military is next called upon to

deter or to respond to a conflict. Strategic risk will not be eliminated at once, but resetting our equipment is a necessary start. Therefore, it is with some relief that I note that \$37 billion in fiscal year 2008 war request is allocated to reconstitute equipment lost or damaged in the war. This should go a long way toward paying for resetting the Army.

“While we cannot neglect the future, I remain concerned over the Future Combat Systems program. I note that your budget eliminates 4 of the previous 18 systems in an effort to refocus on the technologies that show the most promise. I hope you will address the risks that remain in the program.

“Current security commitments have placed an enormous strain on our service members and their families. As I mentioned already, I welcome the President’s proposal to permanently increase the size of the Army. The budget request reflects the first funding to increase the Army by 65,000 over the next five years. This increase will ease the stress our service members and their families are experiencing and the strain on overall military readiness due to the pace of current operations.

“While this end strength increase is good news, we much watch carefully how we achieve it over time. I am concerned that recruit quality continues to decline and I worry that we have not committed enough to retention bonuses. The inability of the Army to meet its authorized end strength of 512,400 for fiscal year 2007 is troubling in this regard. Our military strength is based on the quality of our people and any impact on that will cause exponential ripples throughout the entire force. We must be sure that we continue to pay them what they are worth, and care for the well-being of their families.

“There is much to commend itself in your budget and I look forward to working on it with the Department and my fellow Members over the next few months.

“Now I have a few housekeeping notes to take care of. First, gentlemen, please be so kind as to summarize your testimony. Without objection your full testimony will be entered into the record but I understand we have a four hour time limit and I want to save time for member questions.

“With that, I yield to the Ranking Member.”

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

DR. FRANCIS J. HARVEY  
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

AND

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CHIEF OF STAFF  
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT

FEBRUARY 14, 2007

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America remains at war. This is one of the most dangerous times in our history. We retain the confidence of the Nation as we engage in a long struggle against global terrorism and the conditions that give it life and sustain it. Since 9-11, well over 700,000 active and reserve Soldiers have deployed overseas in support of the war on terror.

Today, almost 600,000 Soldiers are on active duty, serving in nearly 80 countries worldwide. While fighting, we are continuing to prepare our Soldiers, leaders, families, civilians, and forces for the challenges they will face. *Our commitment to current and future readiness in the face of uncertainty* is driving how we are transforming; modernizing; and realigning our entire global infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, and equipment sets.

To fulfill the central role that will be demanded of landpower in the 21st Century, we are becoming a strategically agile, expeditionary force reliant on modular brigades. These modular brigades are designed to deal with the full spectrum of challenges our Nation will face. Their effectiveness in current theaters of operation today validates that we are moving in the right strategic direction.

The recent decision to expand the size of the Armed Forces -- specifically our ground forces -- reflects clear recognition on the part of the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense of the dangers we face, the importance of our mission, and the increasing level of stress that our Soldiers and families are weathering as a result of unprecedented levels of strategic demand over the past five years.

To continue to accomplish our mission in service to the Nation, we require support to:

- Ensure full, timely, and sustained funding to be ready for current and future challenges;
- Expand the size of the Army to build strategic depth and to enhance readiness across all components of the force;
- Implement new policies to assure recurrent, predictable access to Army National Guard and Army Reserve units in order to meet sustained global demand for Army forces;
- Enhance wartime authorities to improve commanders' ability to deal with emerging, in-theater operational demands and to build the capabilities of strategic partners; and
- Support to sustain our All-Volunteer Soldiers, their families, and our Army Civilians and to maintain the trust of the American people, whom we serve in this time of war and uncertainty.

We have received considerable support to execute current operations, to reset our forces, and to build a modular Army. We will need additional support to close the gap between requirements and resources, particularly as we maintain an extraordinarily high operational pace and grow the Army. This support must not be provided at the expense of our future readiness. To break our historic cycle of national unpreparedness, America must invest prudently and predictably in defense, which it can afford to do.

To meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders and the Nation, the Army will require the full level of the resources requested in the base budget and in supplemental appropriations.



### Executive Summary

Soldiers are serving today in one of the most dangerous periods in our history. They are making enormous contributions and sacrifices at the forefront of the Global War on Terror. Their *"boots on the ground"* have enabled historic elections in Afghanistan and Iraq and will be required for democratic institutions to take hold. Operating as part of the Joint Team, our Soldiers are preventing attacks on the Nation, responding to natural disasters at home and abroad, helping to secure our borders, and underwriting our nation's commitment to defend its interests.

In light of the growing threats to the Nation posed by states and non-state movements and organizations, the environment in which our Soldiers will operate will remain extraordinarily dangerous for the foreseeable future. Our mission within this environment will remain largely unchanged. The Army, as a vital ground component of the Joint Team, will be required to conduct prompt, sustained combat and stability operations. We will continue to provide the forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders needed to sustain the full range of U.S. global commitments in the face of growing challenges.

As U.S. ground forces have demonstrated so vividly since 9-11, the ability to operate in the "human dimension" – to directly confront, to defeat, or to otherwise influence our adversaries – can only be provided by putting *"boots on the ground."* Ground forces will play a central role in countering the spread of radical ideologies, influencing people, and bringing order and stability to troubled areas worldwide. This capability will become increasingly important for the Nation and its friends, allies, and coalition partners.

To prepare our Soldiers for the challenges they will face today and tomorrow, and to sustain anticipated levels of demand for Army forces which far exceed deployments to current theaters of operation, we seek to accelerate critical aspects of our transformation.

Recent decisions to expand the size of the Armed Forces – specifically our ground forces – reflect clear recognition on the part of the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense of the dangers we face, the importance of our mission, and the increasing level of stress our Soldiers and families are weathering as a result of unprecedented levels of strategic demand over the past five years.

This recognition must be matched by commensurate levels of national commitment that result in timely, adequate, and predictable resourcing and support. These resources are required to sustain the capacity to wage war and to transform – to build our force in a balanced, coordinated fashion, while providing adequately for the needs of our All-Volunteer Soldiers and their families, across our active and reserve components.

The purpose for our expansion is to build readiness for current and future challenges. We know from our national experience that this is a time consuming process – that depends not only on manning and equipping, but also on training and caring for our people. Likewise, our capacity to grow military forces depends on our capacity to grow and maintain the infrastructure needed to train and sustain these forces.

As we move to expand the size of our force, we will adhere to the four key ideas which have guided our transformation in recent years:

- **Whole Cohesive Units.** First, we remain committed to producing units that are ready for the challenges they will face and to overcoming years of underfunding prior to 9-11. We have received unprecedented support to "buy back" much needed capability. We cannot, however, fool ourselves by maintaining large numbers of forces on paper that, in reality, lack the people, equipment, training, and support needed to accomplish the missions that they will be assigned.
- **Adaptive Leaders and Soldiers.** Second, we recognize that intellectual change precedes physical change. For this reason, we are developing qualities in our leaders, our people, our forces – and the institutions which generate and sustain them – that will enable them to operate effectively amidst uncertainty and unpredictability. We describe the leaders we are creating as "*pentathletes*," whose versatility and agility – qualities that reflect the essence of our Army – will enable them to learn and to adapt to new situations in a constantly evolving environment. To ensure that our Soldiers are well led, we are now actively implementing the findings of a comprehensive review focused on how we train, educate, assign, and develop our officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian leaders.
- **National Commitment.** Third, reinforced by American military experience, we believe that our Soldiers' effectiveness depends upon a national commitment to recruit, to train, and to support them properly. This commitment demands consistent investment in their equipment and supporting infrastructure. We are acutely aware of fiscal constraints; however, we remain firm and unwavering in our determination to fulfill our duty to do what is right for our Soldiers, their families, and the Nation. We are equally determined to improve support for our Soldiers and their families. Our objective is to provide a *quality of life* that matches the *quality of service* they perform for America.
- **Holes in the Force.** Fourth, we remain mindful of our position at the start of the long struggle in which we are now engaged. After years of insufficient investment in the Army, many of our units were under-equipped and not ready for deployment, especially in our reserve units. To meet Combatant Commanders' immediate wartime needs, we pooled equipment from across the force to equip those Soldiers deploying into harm's way – a practice that we are continuing today to meet current operational demands. This practice increases risk in our ability to perform other critical missions, as observed in our Army National Guard during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and in our assessment of our ability to respond to other strategic contingencies.

With help from the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress – through base and supplemental appropriations – we have addressed many of our equipment shortfalls. Supplemental appropriations, however, have not enabled the Army to "get well," as they are intended to pay for the costs of war, principally through the purchase of consumable supplies and the replacement of battle losses. Even with full resourcing, we would still have much to accomplish to mitigate risk as currently assessed (by the Department of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs).

Our need to build readiness to sustain the current mission, to remain relevant and ready to meet future challenges, and to maintain risk at acceptable wartime levels, translates into a set of core objectives which the Army must achieve:

- **Obtain Full, Timely, and Predictable Funding to Sustain the Army's Global Commitments.** *Full, timely, and predictable funding of the Army's Fiscal Year 2008 President's Budget request and supplemental appropriations is required to build readiness needed to execute the National Defense Strategy and to pay for the costs of war. Full funding will enable the Army to provide adequately for Soldiers, families, and Army Civilians; to accelerate key aspects of our transformation; and to maintain the momentum of vital training programs, modernization, and critical stationing initiatives.*
- **Grow the All-Volunteer Force to Sustain the Long War.** *Support and full funding is needed to continue to achieve our goals for attracting and retaining high quality people in each of our active and reserve components. This funding will facilitate the expansion of our operational, deployable force pool – which is vital to sustaining the effectiveness and health of the All-Volunteer force, now being tested for the first time in a long war.*
- **Improve Wartime Authorities and Resources for Soldiers and Commanders in Combat.** *Changes are needed to eliminate unintended constraints on programs such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, and in administering security cooperation and assistance programs, as well as furnishing humanitarian assistance. In addition, continued Congressional leadership will be required to support programs and initiatives to protect Soldiers (to counter Improvised Explosive Devices, to provide up-armored vehicles, to field individual body armor, etc.) and to better equip Iraqi and Afghan police, security, and military forces.*
- **Reset the Force to Ensure Readiness for Current and Future Challenges.** *Full funding is needed to restore units – a process with both materiel and human dimensions – to required levels of readiness to execute projected operational deployments, while remaining prepared for likely future contingencies and homeland defense missions. To be ready, we must not only ensure that battle damaged items are repaired, recapitalized, or replaced; we must also enable our Soldiers and families to recover from the stress of combat and prolonged separation. Resetting the force will require sustained, predictable funding for several years beyond major deployments.*
- **Transform the Force to Sustain the Full Range of our Global Commitments.** *Full funding for Army transformation is needed to create an operational, deployable pool of 76 modular Brigade Combat Teams and approximately 225 Support Brigades. Our transformation is improving our ability to execute and support protracted campaigns by increasing the depth and breadth of our overall capacity. We are converting to more capable modular formations; balancing the size and capabilities of our active and reserve components; and stabilizing our force.*

Our transformation will be reinforced by an Army-wide readiness model to support expeditionary, rotational deployment. This system is designed to: improve the readiness of our non-deployed forces across all components; reduce stress on Soldiers, families, and equipment; improve predictability for employers of reserve component Soldiers; end the need to extend deployments in theater to provide active component Soldiers at least one year at home before redeploying them; and, manage the force to achieve our goal of one year deployed with two years at home station for these Soldiers.

This system requires recurrent, assured, and predictable access to our reserve component units who – because of strategic decisions and operational necessity – have become a vital part of our deployable force pool.

- **Modernize by Accelerating the Fielding of Advanced Technologies to our Soldiers Today.** *Full funding of the Army's modernization program is needed to accelerate aspects of Future Combat Systems (FCS) development, aviation programs, and over 300 other key modernization initiatives.* FCS is our first major modernization program in several decades and is our most critical investment program. In 2008, to enhance combat effectiveness today, FCS will begin to "spin out" key technologies to our current forces – a process projected to continue in roughly two-year intervals. FCS is enabling Soldiers – from our active and reserve components, all U.S. ground forces, and our allies that support ground campaigns – to deal with the full spectrum of challenges they will face.
- **Station the Force to Meet Emerging Strategic Demands While Providing Infrastructure and Services to Enable Mission Accomplishment.** *Full funding and timely passage of key appropriations is needed to achieve the framework of a new global basing posture by 2011 and to enable our installations to deliver a quality of life for our Soldiers, families, and Army Civilians that matches the quality of the service they provide to the Nation.* Our plan will improve our ability to fulfill national strategic requirements and to do so far more efficiently than today. Moreover, the funding provided to the Army will enable us to allocate significantly greater levels of resources to improve the quality and effectiveness of the facilities we depend on to: train, maintain equipment; house and care for our Soldiers, and provide safe, modern working conditions for our Army Civilians.

Our capability to meet current force rotation requirements, and to grow our forces, depends on our ability to adhere to an extremely complex, intricate schedule to realign our entire global infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, and other facilities. Our ability to remain on schedule depends on timely execution of a diverse range of military construction projects and supporting activities (e.g., environmental assessment studies and remediation projects). Timely passage of military construction appropriations is needed to prevent the effects of delays from cascading into other areas of Army activity that put at risk our ability to accomplish our mission – to provide trained, ready forces to meet the Combatant Commanders' needs.

The resources provided in 2007 and 2008, through base and supplemental appropriations, are needed to enable the Army to adhere to the schedule established by law, and to sustain our All-Volunteer Soldiers and their families, now bearing the stress of more than five years of war.

- **Transform Business Practices to Better Enable Army Transformation.** *Continued support is needed to execute Army Business Transformation Initiatives that are achieving targeted efficiencies through: management reform; acquisition reform; comprehensive redesign of the organizations and business processes that generate, deploy, and reset forces; consolidation of bases and activities; military to civilian conversion programs; and performance measurement enhancements.*

This remains a pivotal time for the Army. We will continue worldwide operations to support the war on terror and to sustain the full range of our global commitments. At the same time, we will maintain our focus on transforming the force, our global infrastructure, and our supporting business processes.

Four overarching, interrelated strategies form the core of our plan – which we call The Army Plan. This plan is enabling us to accomplish our mission today and to realize our vision over time: *to remain the preeminent landpower on Earth – the ultimate instrument of national resolve – that is both relevant to, and ready for, the challenges of the dangerous, complex 21st Century security environment.*

Our strategies are summarized in Figure 1. Our compelling needs – expressed in terms of the resources and support we require to execute these strategies – are summarized in Figure 2.

These strategies are driving change at an unprecedented pace. We are making enormous progress in “shifting the weight” of our intellectual and organizational focus from traditional challenges to be better prepared for irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges.

We are developing a broad set of capabilities to deal with, and quickly adapt to, the full spectrum of challenges we will face. Our forces are becoming more powerful, more flexible, and more deployable. We are improving our ability to operate with our Joint and coalition partners. We are also working, while at war, to relieve stress on our Soldiers, families, and Army Civilians to sustain the viability of our All-Volunteer force – which is perhaps our greatest strategic challenge.

The resources and support provided to the Army in 2007, 2008, and beyond will enable us to maintain the momentum of key programs and to accelerate critical aspects of our transformation. Moreover, this funding will determine our ability to continue to accomplish our mission, to complete the shifting of our weight, and to prepare our Soldiers to deal with the challenges they will face today and tomorrow.



Figure 1



Figure 2





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**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

FEBRUARY 14, 2007

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## Impact Examples

| Project Type                   | Requested | Funded | Not Funded |
|--------------------------------|-----------|--------|------------|
| Training Ranges                | 10        | 7      | 3          |
| AFRCs                          | 27        | 13     | 14         |
| Barracks (Perm party Soldiers) | 4,253     | 4,163  | 90         |
| Barracks (Trainee)             | 5,600     | 0      | 5,600      |
| GoL                            | 8         | 1      | 7          |

Not Shown on Chart

Concluded Subject area: **Class**

- Delays or Cuts unravel the Army's synchronized stationing and BRAC plan.
- Puts growth of the Army, stationing, and BRAC at Risk.

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### Military Recruiting and Waivers

The All Volunteer Force has served the nation for over 30 years, providing a military that is experienced, well-trained, disciplined, and representative of America.

Today's military is younger than the population as a whole, is more disciplined, and is more physically and morally fit. Over 90 percent of new recruits are high school diploma graduates while only 80 percent of American youth are. About 67 percent of new enlistees score in the upper half of the enlistment (math/verbal aptitude) test. These attributes translate to lower attrition, more effective training, and higher performance.

Entrance standards are tough; over two-thirds of the American youth populations are disqualified for enlistment by military entrance standards, mainly owing to medical conditions. However, a limited number of enlistees are permitted to enter the military with a waiver of otherwise disqualifying conditions.

Table 1 shows that waivers, as a percentage of accessions, have increased slightly over the last two years but still remain relatively low. Comparing waivers across Services is misleading because waivers are applied against Service-specific standards. The Marine Corps, for example, requires a waiver for "one-time marijuana usage" where the other Services do not. This, in turn, considerably drives up its moral waiver count.

| Fiscal Year                    | 2003           | 2004           | 2005           | 2006           |
|--------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| <b>DoD Total Accessions</b>    | <b>184,847</b> | <b>182,051</b> | <b>160,685</b> | <b>174,509</b> |
| # With Waivers                 | 37,469         | 36,587         | 37,262         | 42,777         |
| % With Waivers                 | 20.3%          | 20.1%          | 23.2%          | 24.5%          |
| <b>Army Accessions</b>         | <b>69,571</b>  | <b>72,233</b>  | <b>65,019</b>  | <b>69,395</b>  |
| # With Waivers                 | 8,836          | 8,918          | 10,185         | 13,518         |
| % With Waivers                 | 12.7%          | 12.3%          | 15.7%          | 19.5%          |
| <b>Marine Corps Accessions</b> | <b>38,685</b>  | <b>36,791</b>  | <b>38,882</b>  | <b>38,217</b>  |
| # With Waivers                 | 18,494         | 18,085         | 19,892         | 20,089         |
| % With Waivers                 | 47.8%          | 49.2%          | 51.2%          | 52.6%          |
| <b>Navy Accessions</b>         | <b>40,462</b>  | <b>39,426</b>  | <b>37,610</b>  | <b>36,187</b>  |
| # With Waivers                 | 6,878          | 6,700          | 5,845          | 6,635          |
| % With Waivers                 | 17.0%          | 17.0%          | 15.5%          | 18.3%          |
| <b>Air Force Accessions</b>    | <b>36,129</b>  | <b>33,601</b>  | <b>19,174</b>  | <b>30,710</b>  |
| # With Waivers                 | 3,261          | 2,884          | 1,340          | 2,535          |
| % With Waivers                 | 9.0%           | 8.6%           | 7.0%           | 8.3%           |

**Table 1 – Non-prior Service Enlisted Accessions with Waivers**

Waivers are an essential part of the enlistment process. A one-time incident may not accurately reflect the character or potential of an enlistee. There must be a process in place to provide for individual consideration, on one's merits. We believe that the contemporary waiver process does that and is successfully anchored on two pillars: first, recognition that young people do wrong things which often are unlikely to recur; second an assurance that the waiver review process is both comprehensive and well-informed by those who best know the young person. Some individuals may even warrant more than one waiver depending on their circumstance. The total number of waivers granted and the reasons for each is displayed in (Table 2).

| Fiscal Year         | Total Waivers |        |        |        | Percent of Waivers |        |        |        |
|---------------------|---------------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|
|                     | 2003          | 2004   | 2005   | 2006   | 2003               | 2004   | 2005   | 2006   |
| <b>DoD</b>          |               |        |        |        |                    |        |        |        |
| Number of Waivers   | 44,613        | 43,611 | 45,639 | 51,982 | 44,613             | 43,611 | 45,639 | 51,982 |
| <b>Waiver Type</b>  |               |        |        |        |                    |        |        |        |
| Aptitude            | 296           | 543    | 49     | 27     | 0.7%               | 1.2%   | 0.1%   | 0.1%   |
| Medical             | 8,886         | 9,829  | 11,373 | 12,313 | 19.9%              | 22.5%  | 24.9%  | 23.7%  |
| Moral               | 30,952        | 29,574 | 30,522 | 34,476 | 69.4%              | 67.8%  | 66.9%  | 66.3%  |
| Other               | 4,479         | 3,665  | 3,695  | 5,166  | 10.0%              | 8.4%   | 8.1%   | 9.9%   |
| <b>Army</b>         |               |        |        |        |                    |        |        |        |
| Number of Waivers   | 8,847         | 8,939  | 10,204 | 13,536 | 8,847              | 8,939  | 10,204 | 13,536 |
| <b>Waiver Type</b>  |               |        |        |        |                    |        |        |        |
| Aptitude            | 0             | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0.0%               | 0.0%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   |
| Medical             | 3,434         | 4,164  | 4,331  | 4,501  | 38.8%              | 46.6%  | 42.4%  | 33.3%  |
| Moral               | 4,918         | 4,529  | 5,506  | 8,129  | 55.6%              | 50.7%  | 54.0%  | 60.1%  |
| Other               | 495           | 246    | 367    | 906    | 5.6%               | 2.8%   | 3.6%   | 6.7%   |
| <b>Marine Corps</b> |               |        |        |        |                    |        |        |        |
| Number of Waivers   | 24,944        | 24,324 | 27,740 | 28,498 | 24,944             | 24,324 | 27,740 | 28,498 |
| <b>Waiver Type</b>  |               |        |        |        |                    |        |        |        |
| Aptitude            | 0             | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0.0%               | 0.0%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   |
| Medical             | 4,304         | 4,433  | 5,835  | 6,235  | 17.3%              | 18.2%  | 21.0%  | 21.9%  |
| Moral               | 19,195        | 18,669 | 20,426 | 20,750 | 77.0%              | 76.8%  | 73.6%  | 72.8%  |
| Other               | 1,445         | 1,222  | 1,479  | 1,513  | 5.8%               | 5.0%   | 5.3%   | 5.3%   |
| <b>Navy</b>         |               |        |        |        |                    |        |        |        |
| Number of Waivers   | 7,420         | 7,171  | 6,239  | 7,330  | 7,420              | 7,171  | 6,239  | 7,330  |
| <b>Waiver Type</b>  |               |        |        |        |                    |        |        |        |
| Aptitude            | 189           | 530    | 46     | 10     | 2.5%               | 7.4%   | 0.7%   | 0.1%   |
| Medical             | 1,050         | 1,024  | 1,098  | 1,451  | 14.2%              | 14.3%  | 17.6%  | 19.8%  |
| Moral               | 4,207         | 3,846  | 3,467  | 3,502  | 56.7%              | 53.6%  | 55.6%  | 47.8%  |
| Other               | 1,974         | 1,771  | 1,628  | 2,367  | 26.6%              | 24.7%  | 26.1%  | 32.3%  |
| <b>Air Force</b>    |               |        |        |        |                    |        |        |        |
| Number of Waivers   | 3,402         | 3,177  | 1,456  | 2,618  | 3,402              | 3,177  | 1,456  | 2,618  |
| <b>Waiver Type</b>  |               |        |        |        |                    |        |        |        |
| Aptitude            | 107           | 13     | 3      | 17     | 3.1%               | 0.4%   | 0.2%   | 0.6%   |
| Medical             | 98            | 208    | 109    | 126    | 2.9%               | 6.5%   | 7.5%   | 4.8%   |
| Moral               | 2,632         | 2,530  | 1,123  | 2,095  | 77.4%              | 79.6%  | 77.1%  | 80.0%  |
| Other               | 565           | 426    | 221    | 380    | 16.6%              | 13.4%  | 15.2%  | 14.5%  |

\* - Number of waivers may exceed "Accessions with Waivers" due to individuals receiving multiple waivers

**Table 2 – Distribution of Waivers by Reason for Waiver**

Table 2 reflects a continuing trend that shows a change in the type of waivers that are being approved. Approximately two-thirds of waivers issued are for moral character, but this number has decreased 3 percentage points since FY2003. On the other hand, medical waivers (at about 24 percent) have increased nearly 4 percentage points over the same period. For the Marine Corps and the Army the changes are even more dramatic. The remainder of waivers is for miscellaneous issues which may include dependency, ASVAB, or other minor exceptions. It is extremely important to note that comparisons over time within a Service are appropriate, but cross-Service comparisons are not. While the standards across the Services are similar, there are minor variations which create Service-specific requirements. For example, when it comes to waiver groupings under "moral" disqualifications – Minor Traffic Violations, a waiver would be required for six such violations, except in the Marine Corps where the standard is somewhat tougher -- five. Therefore, in interpreting these data, close consultation with each Service is important.

For those who have had past involvement with law enforcement, the waiver process recognizes that some young people have made mistakes, have overcome their past behavior, and have clearly demonstrated the potential for being productive, law abiding citizens, and members of the military. The underlying purpose of moral character standards, and associated waivers, is to minimize the risk of enlisting persons who may become disciplinary problems or security risks. Additionally, effective standards should minimize attrition and reduce training costs. Applicants applying for enlistment with a past history of criminal misconduct receive a thorough review of their current character and potential for military service.

For example, a majority of juvenile misconduct offenses occurred at a time when the applicant was immature, and those are given less weight than a more recent offense. Often, misdemeanor charges are subsequently dismissed by the courts after some type of condition has been met; however, the Services do not recognize such dismissals, in that the act was committed and a condition had to be met in order to have the offense forgiven. This policy allows us to treat everyone equitably, recognizing that laws and judicial programs vary considerably across jurisdictions.

**In the course of evaluating waivers, the Services look at factors such as employment stability, success and citizenship in school, references from teachers, coaches, clergy or others who closely observe the young person, as well as signs of remorse and changed behavior since the incident occurred. All of these are important criteria.**

Also noteworthy is the fact that the military does not allow enlistment of anyone who is pending a criminal charge or serving under any type of judicial restraint (probation, parole, confinement or who, in lieu of or as a result of being prosecuted, was ordered by a court to serve in the military). The armed forces are not an alternative to the criminal justice system and shall never be viewed as an alternative source of rehabilitation for those that have not subscribed to the legal and moral standards within American society.

Table 3, provides a distribution of moral waivers that have been approved. A moral waiver is counted only for the most serious offense. For example, if an individual has a Serious Non-Traffic violation that requires a waiver and two or three Minor Non-Traffic offenses, which in and of themselves would require a waiver, we would only count the Serious Non-Traffic waiver for the purpose of this exercise. The most common classification of moral waiver is Serious Non-traffic waivers which are generally serious misdemeanors and may include charges such as petty larceny, vandalism, or a DWI. The Marine Corps is the only Service whose most common moral waiver is for "Drugs". Illustrated in this table is the effect of the Marine Corps' particularly strict accession drug policy requiring a waiver for only a one-time marijuana use.

| Fiscal Year          | Total Moral Waivers |        |        |        | Category Percentages |        |        |        |
|----------------------|---------------------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------|--------|--------|--------|
|                      | 2003                | 2004   | 2005   | 2006   | 2003                 | 2004   | 2005   | 2006   |
| <b>DoD</b>           |                     |        |        |        |                      |        |        |        |
| <i>Moral Waivers</i> | 30,952              | 29,574 | 30,522 | 34,476 | 30,952               | 29,574 | 30,522 | 34,476 |
| <b>Waiver Type</b>   |                     |        |        |        |                      |        |        |        |
| Felony               | 824                 | 638    | 1,163  | 1,605  | 2.7%                 | 2.2%   | 3.8%   | 4.7%   |
| Serious Non-Traffic  | 10,324              | 9,235  | 10,523 | 13,895 | 33.4%                | 31.2%  | 34.5%  | 40.3%  |
| Minor Non-Traffic    | 1,824               | 2,533  | 1,840  | 2,446  | 5.9%                 | 8.6%   | 6.0%   | 7.1%   |
| Serious Traffic      | 1,699               | 1,413  | 929    | 466    | 5.5%                 | 4.8%   | 3.0%   | 1.4%   |
| Minor Traffic        | 1,564               | 1,587  | 1,369  | 1,086  | 5.1%                 | 5.4%   | 4.5%   | 3.2%   |
| Drug                 | 14,717              | 14,168 | 14,698 | 14,978 | 47.5%                | 47.9%  | 48.2%  | 43.4%  |
| <b>Army</b>          |                     |        |        |        |                      |        |        |        |
| <i>Moral Waivers</i> | 4,918               | 4,529  | 5,506  | 8,129  | 4,918                | 4,529  | 5,506  | 8,129  |
| <b>Waiver Type</b>   |                     |        |        |        |                      |        |        |        |
| Felony               | 411                 | 360    | 571    | 901    | 8.4%                 | 7.9%   | 10.4%  | 11.1%  |
| Serious Non-Traffic  | 2,731               | 2,560  | 4,054  | 6,158  | 55.5%                | 56.5%  | 73.6%  | 75.8%  |
| Minor Non-Traffic    | 100                 | 113    | 123    | 169    | 2.0%                 | 2.5%   | 2.2%   | 2.1%   |
| Serious Traffic      | 742                 | 844    | 124    | 35     | 15.1%                | 18.6%  | 2.3%   | 0.4%   |
| Minor Traffic        | 5                   | 6      | 4      | 1      | 0.1%                 | 0.1%   | 0.1%   | 0.0%   |
| Drug                 | 929                 | 646    | 630    | 865    | 18.9%                | 14.3%  | 11.4%  | 10.6%  |
| <b>Marine Corps</b>  |                     |        |        |        |                      |        |        |        |
| <i>Moral Waivers</i> | 19,195              | 18,669 | 20,426 | 20,750 | 19,195               | 18,669 | 20,426 | 20,750 |
| <b>Waiver Type</b>   |                     |        |        |        |                      |        |        |        |
| Felony               | 352                 | 234    | 481    | 511    | 1.8%                 | 1.3%   | 2.4%   | 2.5%   |
| Serious Non-Traffic  | 3,443               | 3,504  | 4,239  | 4,636  | 17.9%                | 18.8%  | 20.8%  | 22.3%  |
| Minor Non-Traffic    | 530                 | 424    | 523    | 515    | 2.8%                 | 2.3%   | 2.6%   | 2.5%   |
| Serious Traffic      | 271                 | 241    | 321    | 315    | 1.4%                 | 1.3%   | 1.6%   | 1.5%   |
| Minor Traffic        | 1,315               | 1,268  | 1,142  | 987    | 6.9%                 | 6.8%   | 5.6%   | 4.8%   |
| Drug                 | 13,284              | 12,998 | 13,720 | 13,786 | 69.2%                | 69.6%  | 67.2%  | 66.4%  |
| <b>Navy</b>          |                     |        |        |        |                      |        |        |        |
| <i>Moral Waivers</i> | 4,207               | 3,846  | 3,467  | 3,502  | 4,207                | 3,846  | 3,467  | 3,502  |
| <b>Waiver Type</b>   |                     |        |        |        |                      |        |        |        |
| Felony               | 56                  | 40     | 109    | 190    | 1.3%                 | 1.0%   | 3.1%   | 5.4%   |
| Serious Non-Traffic  | 2,844               | 2,340  | 1,872  | 2,340  | 67.6%                | 60.8%  | 54.0%  | 66.8%  |
| Minor Non-Traffic    | 548                 | 677    | 911    | 481    | 13.0%                | 17.6%  | 26.3%  | 13.7%  |
| Serious Traffic      | 116                 | 131    | 119    | 66     | 2.8%                 | 3.4%   | 3.4%   | 1.9%   |
| Minor Traffic        | 139                 | 134    | 108    | 98     | 3.3%                 | 3.5%   | 3.1%   | 2.8%   |
| Drug                 | 504                 | 524    | 348    | 327    | 12.0%                | 13.6%  | 10.0%  | 9.3%   |
| <b>Air Force</b>     |                     |        |        |        |                      |        |        |        |
| <i>Moral Waivers</i> | 2,632               | 2,530  | 1,123  | 2,095  | 2,632                | 2,530  | 1,123  | 2,095  |
| <b>Waiver Type</b>   |                     |        |        |        |                      |        |        |        |
| Felony               | 5                   | 4      | 2      | 3      | 0.2%                 | 0.2%   | 0.2%   | 0.1%   |
| Serious Non-Traffic  | 1,306               | 831    | 358    | 761    | 49.6%                | 32.8%  | 31.9%  | 36.3%  |
| Minor Non-Traffic    | 646                 | 1,319  | 283    | 1,281  | 24.5%                | 52.1%  | 25.2%  | 61.1%  |
| Serious Traffic      | 570                 | 197    | 365    | 50     | 21.7%                | 7.8%   | 32.5%  | 2.4%   |
| Minor Traffic        | 105                 | 179    | 115    | 0      | 4.0%                 | 7.1%   | 10.2%  | 0.0%   |
| Drug                 | 0                   | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0.0%                 | 0.0%   | 0.0%   | 0.0%   |

Table 3 – Distribution of Moral Waivers by Level of Waiver

The Services continue to do ensure that numerical recruiting missions are met with above-average young men and women across America. Low-unemployment, a protracted war on terrorism, a decline in propensity to serve, and a growing disinclination of influencers to recommend military service make the current environment a challenging one for recruiters. Despite these conditions, recruiters use waivers with care. The Department will continue to maintain standards which ensure that military recruits surpass the overall qualifications of the contemporary American youth population.



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**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE  
RECORD**

FEBRUARY 14, 2007

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON

The CHAIRMAN. Over the past several months, and particularly since January 20, the Army has lost several helicopters in Iraq, at least four to hostile fire. The Congress, on a bipartisan basis, has consistently supported all Army and Marine Corps requests for force protection equipment. I understand there are effective, laser-based directed infrared countermeasure systems currently installed on over two dozen different types of aircraft, including Air Force C130s, Special Operations Command MH-53 helicopters, and Dutch Apache 64Ds. In the area of aircraft survivability equipment, is this technology of sufficient maturity to be fielded on Army helicopters to defeat man-portable air defense systems? Would the Army benefit from direct infrared countermeasure technology now for large signature aircraft such as Chinook CH-47 helicopters, rather than wait several years for other aircraft survivability technology to be developed and fielded?

Secretary HARVEY. Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) is one of the Army's top priorities and the Army is working to improve existing systems. In addition to what's in the FY08 President's Budget, the FY07 ASE Supplemental requested \$296 million that would procure ASE suppressors for CH-47, AH-64, and UH-60 aircraft, upgrade the Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) with a 5<sup>th</sup> sensor, provide CMWS for Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) aircraft, and procure additional AN/AVR-2B Laser Detection Devices. In FY08, the Army has an unfunded requirement of \$207 million. This amount of funding would be used to continue fleet upgrades to the CMWS system, procure Laser warning devices, continue with suppressor upgrades to the fleet, accelerate Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures (ATIRCM), and procure man portable missile countermeasures trainers to units prior to deployment. The Army requests your continued support in our efforts to protect our soldiers engaged in the Global War on Terror.

The CHAIRMAN. The Fire Scout Class IV UAV is not scheduled for IOC until 2014. However, there are currently eight Fire Scouts UAVs in production that could be made available to the war fighter. Given the recent loss of Army helicopters, would the Army benefit from getting this capability into the hands of soldiers now by fielding these eight air vehicles as soon as possible? What are the specific plans for the Fire Scout UAVs being procured?

Secretary HARVEY. The eight Class IV Unmanned Aerial Systems you reference are pre-production air frames only, not capable of flight yet. The systems are being used to perform integration of Future Combat System (FCS)-specific avionics and computer systems and testing of flight software to meet the FCS requirements. The Preliminary Design Review is July 2008, the Critical Design Review is July 2009 and First Flight is November 2010. These dates are synchronized with the overall FCS integrated schedule. Removing these prototypes from the development schedule and retrofitting them with current payloads, communications and avionics would have a minimal operational impact, but would hamper the FCS integration schedule. Nonetheless, FCS has been working with Northrop Grumman, developer of the Fire Scout, to explore earlier flight opportunities.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER

Mr. HUNTER. Can we get a number for the committee as to how many Humvees we by golly own in the U.S. Army? Number two, how many Humvees the Army Guard says it is short?

Secretary HARVEY. The Army currently has a total requirement for 140,445 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). The Active Component has a requirement for 66,733 vehicles, we have 72,592 vehicles in our inventory, and 25,552 are in Theater. These numbers include over 15,000 Up-armored HMMWVs.

The National Guard has a requirement for 46,278 HMMWVs, has 35,392 on hand and is short 10,866 HMMWVs. The Army has programmed sufficient funding through 2013 to meet 98 percent of the outstanding requirement. The Army requested the remaining 2 percent of the National Guard's HMMWV shortage in the fiscal year 2008 (FY08) Global War on Terrorism request. If this request is fulfilled, the Army National Guard will be equipped at 100 percent of its requirement by

2013. Cascading from the Active Component to the National Guard will not be required if the FY08 supplemental and programmed funding are supported.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT

Mr. EVERETT. Several army helicopters have been shot down in the past few weeks. Without getting into classified areas, what is the Army doing to ensure the safety of pilots flying in theater?

General SCHOOMAKER. No new threats have been identified. The enemy is adaptive and has started using different tactics and techniques. The Army continues to adapt our tactics, techniques and procedures along with continuing to improve the aircraft systems.

Mr. EVERETT. In discussing the issue of Army helicopter crashes with pilots who have flown over there, they are concerned that our Rules of Engagement as well as a limited number of firing ranges are contributing to the recent crashes? Have you examined these factors as possible reasons for the crashes?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Army dispatches an Army Shoot Down Assessment Team to investigate every aircraft incident. Managed out of U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center (CRC), the ASDAT routinely dissects every accident. The investigation results are provided to the Army through a lessons learned secure interactive website. Furthermore, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command ensures aviation curriculum remains updated with any and all lessons learned from the CRC.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the Army's equipping standard for Modular Brigade Combat Teams when not in a combat theater? Is it 100% for all non-deployed Modular BCTs? How is the equipping standard related to the Army Force Generation Model?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Army does not have enough equipment to equip non-deployed Modular Brigade Combat Teams to 100 percent. In accordance with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model published in the Army Campaign Plan, units progress through stages of increasing readiness in manning, equipping, and training in preparation to deploy. Units conduct reset and individual training in the "reset and train" phase and collective training in the "ready" phase before they progress to the "available" phase where they are available to deploy for designated or contingency missions.

Units in "reset and train" will be equipped to the level required to execute the training plan and begin effective collective training. Units in the "ready" phase continue their structured progression to achieve their theater-specific or full-spectrum mission capability. In the highest level of readiness, the unit has every thing it needs to accomplish its assigned mission.

The Army is implementing ARFORGEN in a bridging phase and an objective phase. In the objective state, the standard will be for units to have at least 90 percent of their equipment within 120 days after they redeploy to home station at the end of their available phase. In the current bridging state, the standard is for units to have at least 65 percent of their equipment within 120 days after redeployment, and at least 80 percent of their equipment at least 45 days prior to their mission rehearsal exercise. In both states, bridging and objective, deployed units must have 100 percent of the mission requirement, which they will receive before deployment or through theater provided equipment.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Future Combat Systems (FCS) is designed to "see the enemy first" and avoid unexpected contact in unprecedented ways. What evidence does the Army have from Iraq—where US forces are attacked every day by dozens of hidden IEDs and insurgents—that this new level of "seeing the enemy" will be possible by 2015 when it clearly is not possible today?

General SCHOOMAKER. The question highlights a portion of what the Army calls the "Quality of Firsts" found in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Pamphlet 525-3-2, The United States Army Concept for Tactical Maneuver 2015 - 2024. "These qualities are intended to address the ability of the future Modular Force to operate inside the enemy's cycle of adaptation and to deny the enemy opportunities to initiate action. Moreover, to the extent that the enemy succeeds in achieving surprise or retaining initiative, they constitute an imperative for tactical commanders to take action to quickly regain the initiative." Future Combat Systems will improve, but not resolve the issue of surprise at the tactical level. Today many insurgents and IEDs are identified and dealt with by the current force, yet we must get

better. Formations with FCS capabilities will certainly perform much better than current forces due the greater numbers of manned and unmanned sensors, linkages to joint and higher intelligence sources, improved ability to share information via the network, and the ability to pass this greater situational awareness in near real time to individual platforms and Soldiers. An FCS-equipped brigade will have a 522.6% increase in the number of sensor capabilities compared to the current heavy brigade combat team. For example, real-time demonstrations in February 2007 with FCS unmanned aerial vehicle assets showed these gains when Soldiers used them to detect simulated roadside bombs and IEDs and planned routes away from them; this was not an intended result of this demonstration, but Soldiers recognized and exploited this capability to their benefit.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The FCS design appears to depend upon an almost total dominance of the air by US forces in order to fly its hundreds of UAVs, move supplies to dispersed units, maintain its network, and collect intelligence through joint intelligence assets. To what extent are FCS units of the future going to be dependent upon the US Air Force and US Navy to control the air, fly in supplies, and provide intelligence?

General SCHOOMAKER. Today, each element of the U.S. Joint force depends upon others for certain capabilities and the future holds even greater demands for this joint interdependence. Future Combat Systems is designed to leverage the capabilities of the entire joint force (air, land, and sea) through advanced networking, joint fires, and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Land forces with FCS will depend on air support just as current forces do today. However, the FCS brigade will have 122 organic UAV assets available to the tactical commander. These land forces will in turn provide increased, real time information to improve the intelligence picture for the entire joint force using advanced sensors and networking. The Army will continue to work with the other Services on airspace management and sustainment to ensure both manned and unmanned air assets from FCS and other programs operate safely and to maximum effect. Commonality of parts, improved reliability of components will reduce the logistical footprint of the FCS BCTs and reduce the dependence on support from the Air Force and Navy as compared to current logistical requirements of brigades deployed in OIF/OEF. Projecting and sustaining land forces in austere environments requires the entire joint team.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. To what extent will FCS units depend upon satellites to provide communications and intelligence? Has the Army done any analysis to determine whether or not there will be enough satellites and enough bandwidth to support FCS units in 2015?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Future Combat Systems' (FCS) is a system of systems and must have the capability to detect, classify, recognize, identify and locate enemy combatant systems and identify with the precision necessary to meet assured lethality in all operational environments. This is achieved through the three-tier transport architecture, ground, air, space via the JTRS and WIN-T program of records.

A wideband satellite communication capability will be incorporated into manned vehicle platforms within the FCS BCT. There will be three variations of these SATCOM platforms; an on the move (OTM) Ku/Ka-band terminal, an OTM Ku/Ka-band terminal with an OTM Global Broadcast System capability and an at the quick halt (ATQH) variant that will enable higher throughput at the expense of mobility.

In addition to the wideband SATCOM capability, the FCS BCT will incorporate a narrowband UHF SATCOM capability into a number of manned ground vehicles, intended to serve as a lifeline capability to guarantee users a connection into the network independent of the state of the rest of the FCS ground, air, space network. This capability will migrate to Mobile User Objective System as this terminal and space solution matures.

The Army conducted analysis of WIN-T bandwidth requirements in 2005 to determine whether there will be enough satellites and bandwidth to support the units in 2015. This analysis was based on operational scenarios that were used to insure the most stringent conditions the network must support. This worst case analysis framed the scope of the WIN-T modeling performed. The analysis determined that there will be enough satellites and bandwidth to support the units in 2015.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Two of the critical programs that will enable FCS units to operate, the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T), have experienced program delays. If these two programs are further delayed will FCS have to be delayed as well? What is the backup plan if these two critical programs that will provide the FCS network don't deliver on schedule? Can FCS brigades operate without these two systems?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program is synchronized with the FCS program to ensure required capabilities are delivered to

FCS in time for their needs. In fact, JTRS has delivered approximately 50 Pre-engineering design modules (EDM) radios to meet FY07 FCS capability needs and another 50 radios will be delivered in order to satisfy the FCS requirements for testing and experimentation on various FCS platforms. JTRS has undergone an extensive restructuring during the last year. At this time, the JTRS programs are characterized as moderate risk.

The WIN-T program is synchronized to deliver EDM to FCS by FY09, which meet all size, weight, and power specifications for the required WIN-T points of presence on the FCS platforms. A preliminary design review was conducted in January 2007 by the Project Manager, WIN-T, at which the schedule, specifications, and delivery dates of all of the WIN-T items needed for test and integration were presented.

There is a back-up plan if the WIN-T and JTRS programs don't deliver on schedule, which is illustrated by supported spin-outs to develop and field FCS capabilities. However, there is not currently an Army system that provides significant bandwidth and throughput to support the mobile ad-hoc environment envisioned for FCS brigade combat team operations.

The Program Manager, FCS continuously assesses the impact of variables on the program. While most are controllable, uncontrollable variables impacting schedule would need to be assessed further to determine the extent of the impact. PM FCS maintains an extensive risk analysis plan designed to help monitor and address identified risks (should they become problems) related to the network's schedule and performance. Recognized as critical programs, WIN-T and JTRS indeed serve as the backbone of the FCS network, thus the absence of either would noticeably impact the FCS' system of systems in a manner that would essentially digress from a SoS concept back to a single vehicle at a time replacement of radios.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN

Mr. MEEHAN. It was my understanding that the Army had cut recruiting efforts this year by \$125 million; is that true?

Secretary HARVEY. No, the Army has not cut funding from its recruiting budget. The budget for recruiting is contained in both the base and supplemental and therefore it could be misleading to look at numbers contained in just one of the documents.

The Army increased funding from FY03 to FY07 to support recruiting the All-Volunteer Force. The Army spent \$1 billion in FY03, \$1.3 billion in FY04, \$1.6 billion in FY05, \$2.1 billion in FY06 and in FY07 the Army requested \$2.3 billion for recruiting.

The current FY07 base budget and supplemental request reflect the Department's projected requirements by component. Within individual components, the Active Component and Army Reserve funding grows from FY06 to FY07. Due to the FY06 success of the Army National Guard in closing its end strength shortfall, funding for recruiting declines from FY06 to FY07. The Army will continue to closely monitor its FY07 recruiting results and make any necessary internal adjustments.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. Do you share the concerns of Members of both the House and the Senate that we need to revisit this issue on losing the educational benefit once they are out of the reserve component?

General SCHOOMAKER. Under the Montgomery GI Bill there are two major educational programs available to Reserve Component Soldiers: the Montgomery GI Bill-Selected Reserve (MGIB-SR, or chapter 1606 of title 10, U. S. Code) and the "Reserve Educational Assistance Program" (REAP or Chapter 1607).

The Montgomery GI Bill-Selected Reserve is an educational assistance program enacted by Congress to attract high quality men and women into the reserve branch of the Armed Forces. MGIB-SR does not require a Soldier contribution, and effective October 1, 2006 pays \$309.00 per month to a full-time student. Soldiers have up to 14 years to use this benefit after becoming eligible as long as they remain a member of the Selected Reserve (SELRES).

The 2005 National Defense Authorization Act provides an educational benefit for those Reserve Component (RC) members mobilized in support of a contingency or national emergency. This benefit is referred to as the "Reserve Educational Assistance Program" (REAP) or Chapter 1607. REAP provides a tiered educational benefit based on the length of active duty time and does not require a Soldier contribution. To receive this benefit, a member of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) must remain in at least the IRR while drawing educational benefits. An IRR member may

transition to the SELRES, but a SELRES member can not transition to the IRR and continue to draw benefits. The tiered benefit is pegged at 40% of the 3-year Montgomery GI Bill Active Duty (MGIB-AD) benefit for eligible Reserve Soldiers mobilized for at least 90 days of active duty (AD) service, 60% for those with at least one year of AD service, and 80% for those with at least two years of AD service.

The Montgomery GI Bill programs are necessary recruiting and retention tools for all Army components. However, rising educational costs in recent years have diluted the impact of the monthly stipends. The Army supports legislation to ensure the monthly stipends benefit adequately addresses rising educational costs. The Army also supports extending the eligibility timeframe for using Montgomery GI Bill benefits to ensure Soldiers are afforded a reasonable time period to transition into society.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Mr. WILSON. As we are discussing the reinforcements for General Petraeus, it has been stated that our troops do not have body armor. They don't have proper uparmored Humvees or even helmets. I would like again a restatement—indeed, the persons outside the wire, people who are in harm's way, surely family members need to know that their young people are fully equipped.

General SCHOOMAKER. The U.S. Army's priority is sending only the best trained and equipped Soldiers into combat operations and that means providing the best force protection equipment for Soldiers. Even as we increase our commitment in Operation Iraqi Freedom and beyond, we will continue to provide all Soldiers with the best force protection available.

In terms of personal force protection, every Soldier and DoD civilian in Theater is equipped with the best body armor in the world, Interceptor Body Armor. Over 900,000 sets of body armor as well as 271,000 Deltoid Axillary Protectors and 276,000 Ballistic Side Plates have been fielded. The Rapid Fielding Initiative has also outfitted 800,000 Soldiers with over 40 off-the-shelf items that improve an individual's capability and protection, such as protective eye wear, knee pads, wick-away undergarments, radios, improved first aid kits, and Advanced Combat Helmets.

Force protection equipment is not just limited to personal items; the Army manages a robust fleet of vehicles. In Iraq alone, we have gone from a low of 400 up-armored HMMWVs to nearly 15,000 up-armored HMMWVs, over 380 Abrams tanks, 630 Bradley fighting vehicles, 360 Strykers, and about 1,000 other armored vehicles including the mine resistant ambush protection-like series of vehicles with v-shaped hulls. Everyday these vehicles are patrolling, protecting troops, and mitigating risk from most types of enemy munitions.

While all these improvements have been substantial, the comprehensive process of assessing lessons learned to find and accelerate technological advancements to Soldiers continues.

An excellent example is how the Army is improving the HMMWV, based on the ever-changing battlefield threat. As of this date, the Army has produced enough Fragmentary Kits 1, 3, and 5 to outfit every HMMWV in Afghanistan and Iraq. Safety enhancements such as driver restraints and fire suppression systems have been added as well. Contrary to news reports, the Army has sufficient up-armored HMMWVs being produced or fitted with force protection and safety enhancements to meet the plus-up requirement. These vehicles are being shipped directly from the factory to theater to ensure our Soldiers have HMMWVs with essential force protection improvements as they "cross the berm" into harm's way.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COLE

Mr. COLE. First, I would very much appreciate your remarks about funding the BRAC process. I know a number of us voted actually against the continuing resolution because that had been stripped out of it, and I think many of our colleagues who voted for it, had they had the opportunity to vote separately on that item or amend it, would have certainly restored those funds. So I am hopeful, going forward, we could find a way to do that.

But could you tell us in some detail, perhaps mentioning specific installations, if you like, or whatever the impact will be if that does not occur?

Secretary HARVEY. Cuts and/or delays in BRAC funding will have an operational impact on the training, mobilization, and deployment of forces in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Under the fiscal year 2007 (FY07) House Joint Resolution 20, the Army will only be able to award 34 of the planned 75 BRAC con-

struction projects assuming the Army receives \$1.6 billion. Forty-one projects planned for FY07 would slip into FY08, where the Army already has 89 BRAC construction projects planned; therefore, a total of 130 projects will have to be reviewed and re-prioritized in FY08 to support the Army's operational requirements and re-stationing efforts.

Specifically, the operational and quality of life impacts will be:

a. The Army will be forced to delay building new Army brigades, reduce forces available for combat rotations, and complicate reset strategies - increasing the operational tempo of existing brigades.

b. The Army will delay Reserve Component transformation by funding only 13 of 27 Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs) thereby adversely affecting training, equipping, recruitment and retention.

c. Reduced funding affects the All-volunteer force by breaking the Nation's obligation to provide Soldiers and their families' adequate quality of life (QOL) facilities such as new barracks, dental clinics, child development centers, and youth centers.

The following examples illustrate the impacts of operational, training & QOL projects that fall below the \$1.6 billion funding provided by FY07 HJRes 20, and are further illustrated in a chart that outlines the FY07 BRAC impacts, funded and unfunded, with example impacts.

a. Fort Bliss (\$42.5 million): two training projects, the battle command center and ammunition supply point—without these projects, Soldiers and units will be unable to train and prepare for operational deployments.

b. Fort Benning (\$293 million): Training barracks complexes, a brigade headquarters and three ranges—the Armor Center will not be able to move to Fort Benning and the Army will be unable to increase initial entry training numbers in order to meet operational demands.

c. Cannot begin to move the Human Resources Command to Fort Knox; Combat Services Support Center at Fort Lee, recruiting facilities at Redstone Arsenal, and barracks at Shaw Air Force Base—severely restricts Army's ability to recruit, retain and to deploy units to meet operational demands (\$318 million).

d. QOL requirements (\$42 million; seven projects): youth and child development centers at Forts Benning, Riley, Bliss, and Sam Houston; and dental clinics at Forts Bliss and Sam Houston—critical to population on ground, the network is insufficient to handle increased medical and dental needs and soldiers cannot deploy if they are not medically fit and families are taken care of while soldiers are deployed.

e. Aberdeen Proving Ground (\$145 million): cannot start Phase 1 of the Communications/Electronics Research, Development, and Evaluation Center—the Army will not be able to close Fort Monmouth and support GWOT.

f. Fourteen of 27 Armed Forces Reserve Centers in 10 states (approximately \$574 million):—impacts Reserve Component training, equipping, transforming and the support of operational requirements.

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 63.]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE

Mr. KLINE. It seems that if your previous service was in Kosovo, you were treated in one way; If your previous service was in Bosnia, you were treated another way. It impacts around 400 or so guardsmen in Minnesota, and so this is my appeal to you to please check on the status of that report which was frankly due more than six months ago and see if you can come back to us on that issue. It is an unanswered question in the State of Minnesota.

Secretary HARVEY. The Fiscal Year 2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 109-64, section 678, directs the Army to report to Congress: 1) the number of members of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve affected by a disparate treatment afforded to members who were mobilized pursuant to 10 USC § 12304 in determining assignment incentive pay (AIP); and 2) proposed remedies or courses of action to address disparity, including allowing time served during a mobilization pursuant to 10 USC § 12304 to count toward the time needed to qualify for AIP. An interim report was provided to Congress in December 2006 and the final report was completed and delivered to Congress on February 15, 2007.

The report advises that the Army has proposed a new AIP program to compensate Soldiers who agree to volunteer beyond 12 months boots on the ground (OIF/OEF).



Implementation of this program will follow OSD approval, which is pending. This program compensates Active Component Soldiers serving in assignments that are echelons above brigade who voluntarily extend beyond their 12 months boots on the ground (OIF/OEF). All Reserve Component Soldiers who agree to serve beyond 12 months boots on the ground, regardless of the amount of time served under Presidential Reserve Call-up (PSRC), 10 U.S.C. § 12304, or Partial Mobilization, under the provisions of (UP) 10 U.S.C. § 12302, will be eligible for this compensation. The AIP program, requiring RC Soldiers exhaust their Partial Mobilization authorization clock of 730 days and volunteer under 12301(d), will be eliminated.

The PDUSD/P&R authorized the use of AIP for certain Reservists on August 6, 2004, to assist the Army with a specific readiness issue at that time. Soldiers in a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) were approaching the completion of their involuntary mobilization time UP 10 U.S.C. § 12302. These Soldiers' continued service was needed, so they volunteered UP 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) to remain in Theater to ensure unit readiness and cohesion, until the unit completed 12 months boots on the ground. The Army had not used PSRC authority since November 2004, and there were no Soldiers in the BCT who had served under PSRC. Therefore, Soldiers who had served under both 10 USC §§ 12304 and 12302 were not included in this policy.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK

Mr. SESTAK. Why have you only asked for \$125 million in recruiting money this year in the budget, and last year we spent \$860 million?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Army increased funding from FY03 to FY07 to support recruiting the All-Volunteer Force. The Army spent \$1 billion in FY03, \$1.3 billion in FY04, \$1.6 billion in FY05, \$2.1 billion in FY06 and in FY07 the Army requested \$2.3 billion for recruiting. The budget for recruiting is contained in both the base and supplemental and therefore must be combined to accurately reflect the amount spent on recruiting.

The Army increased funding from FY03 to FY07 to support recruiting the All-Volunteer Force. The current FY07 base budget and supplemental request reflect the Department's projected requirements by component. Within individual components, the Active Component and Army Reserve funding grows from FY06 to FY07. Due to the FY06 success of the Army National Guard in closing its end strength shortfall, funding for recruiting declines from FY06 to FY07. The Army will continue to closely monitor its FY07 recruiting results and make any necessary internal adjustments.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CASTOR

Mr. CASTOR. How many Army soldiers are currently deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Secretary HARVEY. There are 130,000 Soldiers currently deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Mr. CASTOR. What is the outlook for the mission in Afghanistan? Summarize the mission plan for the Army.

Secretary HARVEY. Our military is working with the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), conducting operations that provide security, stability, and maturing governance to the people of Afghanistan. Through Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTCA), continue to mature and grow the Afghanistan Security Forces. We are working with allies and partners to build capacity and set conditions for regional security and prosperity.

Mr. CASTOR. Detail the troop rotations schedules for the coming year.

Secretary HARVEY. The Secretary of Defense has approved the deployment or extension of the following units: Division Headquarters, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry, Combat Aviation Brigade of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division; 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division; 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division and 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division; and the extension of 1/34<sup>th</sup> Brigade Combat Team. Additionally, a number of combat support and combat service support units have been deployed in support of the plus-up. These include engineer and military police battalions, explosive ordnance companies, forward surgical teams, tactical psychological detachments, and postal units. The 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division has deployed in support Operation Enduring Freedom.

Mr. CASTOR. What are the equipment and modernizations pressures in Afghanistan and back home for the Army, National Guard and Army Reserves?

Secretary HARVEY. Equipment pressures in theater (OIF/OEF) are the continued evolution of the threat against our force protection vehicle and individual Soldier

solutions. Timely reaction to these threats results in rapidly changing priorities in executing our funding. Even today, emerging solutions to protect our Soldiers demand funding changes that will lessen procurement of equipment for our units back home—Active, National Guard and Army Reserve. The primary impact of these changes will be filling the equipping requirements for non-deployed Soldiers and units, and in their preparation for other potential contingencies. The Army has been filling the original \$56 billion in equipping shortfalls that existed at the start of the conflict. With the tremendous support of Congress, we have filled \$47 billion of those shortfalls, leaving \$9 billion remaining. However, the experiences of today's warfare necessitate changes in our modernization design, to include structuring the Reserve Components to the same modern design as their active counterparts. To complete this equipping, an additional \$43 billion is needed: \$24 billion for the National Guard, \$10 billion for the Army Reserve, and \$9 billion for the Active Component support unit modernization. This total of \$52 billion in shortfalls (\$9 billion original + \$43 billion modernization) is within the current program. An additional \$10 billion per year for each year remaining in the program (FY09-13) would be needed to complete fielding equipment to all components by FY15.

Mr. CASTOR. Identify particular parts of base budget and supplemental requests that align with mission in Afghanistan.

Secretary HARVEY. In the Army FY08 Supplemental request there is approximately \$7.6 billion aligned to the mission in Afghanistan. The total consists of the following breakout by category: Operations and Maintenance—\$3.4 billion, Military Pay, \$9 billion, Procurement, \$5 billion, Military Construction \$1 billion, and Security Forces \$2.7 billion. The base budget does not have funds aligned to the mission in Afghanistan.

Mr. CASTOR. What are the current challenges for Army, National Guard and Army reserve in support roles for civil authorities in time of natural disaster, i.e. equipment, timing of equipment delivery and available personnel?

Secretary HARVEY. During a disaster, personnel availability is usually not a significant challenge but challenges do exist because the Army National Guard has less equipment than is authorized. When a disaster-stricken state or territory needs a response and recovery capability not available inside that state or territory, it can receive additional capability from other states or territories through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. While this prevents a state or territory from being without capability, such a transaction takes time and time is of the essence in disaster response. As a result, Army National Guard equipment shortages may result in slower response times during a disaster.

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) is challenged by a shortage of approximately 23% (124,946 pieces) of the equipment designated by the National Guard as "dual-purpose" (Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) equipment that fill both the MTOE mission and also potential state missions). The total equipment shortage for the USAR is \$10.749 billion. As one of the nation's first federal responders, the Army Reserve provides the requested MTOE unit capabilities (Transportation, Medical, Aviation, Engineer, Quartermaster, etc) to the states and other agencies when directed. Those capabilities consist of both equipment and unit personnel (equipment operators and support personnel) required for prompt and successful disaster response. The responding USAR unit equipment shortages often require equipment cross leveling from units in other parts of the country. While the USAR has always been successful meeting disaster relief requirements, the response time will increase if necessary equipment must be borrowed from other locations. During FY06, the USAR repositioned over 3000 items of equipment to better posture the USAR'S response to hurricanes or other disasters. Although there are challenges, USAR forces will continue to support mission requirements in response to natural disasters. A concern is that while equipment procurement for the Army is supported, unless dedicated procurement is provided for the Army Reserve, the equipment, as in the past, will be diverted to other Army priorities and not result in USAR equipping, or improvements to our unit readiness.